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" That all true believers shall break their eggs at the convenient end": and which is 
the convenient end, seems in my humble opinion, to be left to everyman's 
conscience or at least in the power o f the chief magistrate to determine."
Gulliver's Travels: A Voyage to Lillliput 
Jonathan Swift Everymans Library 1986
The Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (the FAT Act) was enacted in 
19741 to allow the Commonwealth to review the inflow of capital into Australia and the 
sale of Australian business interests to foreigners. The provisions of the FAT Act were 
litigated for the first time in the Act's twenty year history in Leisure & Entertainment Ptv 
Ltd v The Honourable Ralph Willis Federal Treasurer o f the Commonwealth of Australia2, 
despite the fact that the subject matter o f the FAT Act and the decisions of the Treasurer 
are often the subject of community discussion, comment and controversy.3 The Australian 
icons o f Vegemite, Arnott's and Speedo, or more strictly the companies that own these 
brand names, have all been sold to foreign interests with the Treasurer's consent. All these 
sales sparked comment and discussion. Section 18(2) o f the FAT Act permits a foreign 
company to acquire the shares of an Australian company, so long as the acquisition is not 
contrary to the national interest. The Treasurer is designated by the FAT Act to make this 
decision.4 The takeover by Conrad Black of the Fairfax Group in 1993 provided the 
Senate with an opportunity to investigate the workings o f the Foreign Investment Review 
Board (FIRB) and undertake a comprehensive review o f Australia's Foreign Investment
'The FAT Act was enacted in 1974 under the title of the Foreign Takeovers Act (" the FT Act"). For a 
more detailed history of the FAT Act see page 4 and following.
2No QG 204 of 1995 Spender J Brisbane 2 January 1996 Judgement 1 of 1996.
3The sale of the food division of Pacific Dunlop Ltd to foreign interests in July 1995 resulted in comment 
both in the popular press and television.
4For a detailed discussion of the provisions of the FAT Act see Chapter 2 "The FAT Act: a Short 
Analysis".
2policy.5 Up until this time the workings of the Foreign Investment Branch of Treasury 
(FIB) and the FIRB had been shrouded in mystery. Yet the FIRB is still unwilling to 
release information given to it, explain its decision-making processes or even give reasons 
for its decisions. This poses some interesting questions for the public lawyer.
The FAT Act imposes one criterion upon the Treasurer when he makes his 
decision on the acquisition by a foreign person: he must address the question, is the 
proposed acquisition contrary to the national interest? 6 What, then, is the national interest? 
What issues constitute the national interest? Do the Courts have a proper role in reviewing 
the decisions of the Treasurer? Should the Courts involve themselves in a review, which 
is, at first glance, in the realm of politics and economics and involves multifaceted and 
multi-discipline decision making?
A review of the decisions of the Treasurer may be justified on a number of bases. 
The most obvious reason is that the Treasurer has made a decision that is ultra vires the 
FAT Act. Less obvious reasons may involve an applicant who uses judicial review grounds 
to defend a criminal charge brought under the FAT Act; that is, the act alleged to be 
unlawful cannot be unlawful as the decision upon which the unlawful act is based is a 
nullity; or, a corporation or a person attempts to stop the divestiture of assets by the 
Treasurer under the divestiture provisions. In these last two cases, the applicant is using 
judicial review grounds as a form of collateral attack against the decision of the Treasurer.
The FAT Act although small in size7, is quite complex. The FAT Act has five 
operative sections dealing with (i) acquisition o f shares, 8 (ii) acquisition of assets,9 (iii) 
arrangements relating to the control o f the Board o f Directors or alteration of the
5Percentage Players: The 1991 and 1993 Fairfax Ownership Decisions: The First Report of the Senate 
Select Committee on Certain aspects of Foreign Ownership Decisions in Relation to the Print Media; 
Senate Printing Unit Canberra 1994 (the Senate Print Media Inquiry)
6For a detailed discussion of the provisions of the FAT Act see Chapter 2 "The FAT Act: a Short 
Analysis".
7The FAT Act has only 39 clauses and 3 regulations.
8FAT Act s i8
9FAT Act s i9
o
3constituent documents o f companies,10 (iv) arrangements relating to the control of 
Australian businesses11 and (v) the acquisition of Australian urban land.12 An effort has 
been made in recent years to reduce the number of transactions that the FAT Act 
controls.13 However, this does not detract from the fact that non-compliance with its 
terms may lead to quite draconian measures being taken by the Treasurer.14
Foreign Investment Policy in Australia
Australia has traditionally been a large net importer of capital which has been used 
to supplement Australian domestic savings. The policy of successive Australian 
governments has been to welcome foreign investment into Australia. The purpose of this 
investment is to encourage economic growth through increased economic activity. The 
perceived benefits o f the investment of foreign capital are considerable: the investment 
provides access to new technologies, management skills and overseas markets and 
ultimately an increased standard of living. The policy is designed to be consistent with 
Australian needs by encouraging the development of export oriented industries to increase 
Australia's international competitiveness. The present Australian Government policy was 
published in 1992 by the then Treasurer John Dawkins.15 The present policy is premised 
on the joint beliefs that the 'international nature o f trade' and the freeing up of markets 
enhance Australia's ability to sustain economic growth.16
Opinion is divided as to whether foreign investment should be regulated. The 
removal o f foreign investment regulations to allow for the unrestricted interplay of market
10FAT Act s20 
n FAT Act s21 
12FAT Act s21A
13The thresholds that exempt transactions from the provisions of the FAT Act were raised in 1992. See 
Australia's Foreign Investment Policy AGPS, Canberra, September 1992, p 2
14The Treasurer is entitled to order divestiture of assets (si9(2)), rearrange the constituant documents of a 
corporation (s20(2)), the divestiture of shares (si8(2)) are examples. The Treasurer is also entitled to 
institute criminal sanctions. For a further discussion of these see Chapter 2.
1 Australia's Foreign Investment Policy, AGPS, Canberra, September 1992, p v.
16Australia's Foreign Investment Policy, AGPS, Canberra, September 1992, p v.
4forces to determine the right level of foreign investment is one argument.17 However 
Professor Frank Stillwell18 raises six arguments against the unrestricted use of foreign 
investment:
" 1. The reliance upon overseas investment, together with corporate 
borrowing, is responsible for many of Australia's economic difficulties;
2. There are dependency problems whereby the fortunes of the local 
economy have become reliant on decisions taken overseas,
3. Foreign capital inflows have the potential to accumulate boom and bust 
cycles;
4. The reliance on foreign capital is not conducive in many respects to the 
development;
5. Some overseas companies may not be appropriately discharging their 
obligation to pay taxes to the Australian government; and
6. Cultural imperialism, for example, in the media may also be a 
problem."19
The community is not so ready to accept the necessity for or the present level of foreign 
investment in Australia. The takeover o f Amott's Pty Ltd by Campbell Soups Inc and the 
continuing Fairfax saga are examples o f community concern. Community expectation 
seems to run in favour of a heavily controlled foreign investment policy .20
Australia is a signatory to the OECD Declaration on International Investment And 
Multinational Enterprises (1976)21 as amended. This document requires the strengthening 
o f co-operation between members in the field of international direct investment. This is 
achieved by making "local regulations and administrative practices as transparent as 
possible so that their importance and purpose can be ascertained and the information on
17Dr David Robertson, Senior Research Fellow, National Centre for Development Studies, ANU,
Canberra, in evidence to the Senate Print Media Inquiry at p 174 put forward this view. He had been a
member of the FIRB division. See List of Witnesses Senate Print Media Inquiry Appendices 17
18Associate Professor of Economics, University of Sydney, NSW. See List of Witnesses Senate Print
Media Inquiry Appendices 17
19Senate Print Media Inquiry para 7.5 p l74 - 5
20See discussion in the majority opinion of the Senate Print Media Inquiry, paras 7.8 and 7.9, pl75-176. 
21 Australia associated itself with the declaration and a number of procedural decisions in June 1976.
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5them can be readily available."22 However, as the Senate Print Media Inquiry determined, 
many signatory countries have foreign investment restrictions in place.23
The FAT Act has had a twenty year history. It was preceded by the Foreign 
Takeovers Act (1974) (the FT Act) which was introduced by the Whitlam government.
This was done to allay community disquiet in the 1960s and early 1970s of the 
unregulated inflow of foreign capital, 'rising levels of foreign ownership and control of 
Australian industry and resources.'24 The FT Act established a requirement that successful 
applications for foreign investment proposals had to show a 'demonstrable benefit to 
Australia' and that Australian interests had adequate opportunity to purchase the business 
or property in question.
In 1976 the Fraser government established a non-statutory board known as the 
Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB). The FIRB replaced the committee of public 
servants who had, until that time, advised the government in respect of decisions made 
under the FT Act. This change was designed to give the government independent advice 
from persons who reflect community and business sector interests.
By a legislative change in 1986, the Hawke Government removed the 'net 
economic benefit' test and its accompanying requirement that Australians be given an 
opportunity to purchase any business created, or taken over, by the foreign investment. 
These two requirements were replaced with the all inclusive 'national interest' test. The 
Hawke government regarded this test as a reflection o f the proposition that 'foreign direct 
investment is typically of benefit to the recipient economy'.25 The overall policy focus was 
not changed because of this new test. The new test seemingly only facilitated the review of 
applications rather than establishing any fundamental change in government policy.
22OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (1976) III Conflicting 
Requirements
23Chart 7.1 Senate Print Media Inquiry p i77 quoting International direct investment policies and trends 
in the 1980's (OECD Paris 1992) p38.
24Senate Print Media Inquiry para 7.17 pl78.
25Treasury submission Senate Print Media Inquiry para 7.22 p i79.
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6The FT Act was extensively amended in 1989 and renamed the FAT Act. The 
amendments raised the threshold for review of investment proposals and strengthened the 
penalties for non-compliance with the provisions of the Act. The FAT Act also saw the 
introduction o f acceptance of proposals subject to certain conditions. There had been 
some concern under the FT Act that the Treasurer was unable to impose conditions on 
applications.26
Administration of Australian Foreign Investment Policy
Australian foreign investment policy is administered by the FIB. The FIB
undertakes the day to day administration associated with foreign investment applications.
The FIB has direct contact with the applicant and any interested parties; it examines all
applications to see if they conform with the present foreign investment policy; it not only
processes applications, it also advises applicants on how to structure applications to meet
policy guidelines. The FIB then draws up a report, containing its recommendations, in the
form of a departmental minute. The report is forwarded to the FIRB and the FIRB may
make changes or agree with the FIB recommendation before the submission is submitted
for approval or rejection by the Treasurer or the Assistant Treasurer. The FIB has been
delegated the authority to approve applications in the residential real estate sector where
the application complies with existing policy. The FIB is not a secretariat for the FIRB, as
the Senate Print Media Inquiry found :
”... [The] Treasury staff are public servants employed to administer existing 
government policy and facilitate the development o f new or revised policy, 
where necessary, using FIRB as a mechanism to those ends. ”27
The FIB also has an enforcement role. Any of the conditions which are imposed on
applications are enforced by the FIB staff. This feature of the role o f the FIB is rarely
emphasised.
2oUp until this time conditions had been imposed although successive governments were not always 
convinced that they could enforce them. See the Senate Print Media Inquiry p i79-180.
27Senate Print Media Inquiry para 8.17, p 198
7It is often thought that the FIRB administers foreign investment policy in 
Austalia.28 This is not the case. The FIRB was established to advise the government on 
policy and to give recommendations and advice about proposed investments. The FIRB 
funcions as a non-statutory board. The functions of the FIRB are as follows:
1. to examine proposals by foreign interests for investment in Australia 
and to make recommendations to the government on those proposals,
2. to advise the government on foreign investment matters generally;
3. to foster an awareness and understanding of the government's policy in 
the community at large and in the business sector, both in Australia and 
abroad; and
4. to provide guidance, where necessary, to foreign investors so that their 
proposals may be in conformity with policy.29
The executive member of the FIRB, Mr Tony Hinton30, summarised the role of
FIR3 to the Senate Print Media Inquiry as follows:
"[The] FIRB is an advisory body. It provides advice to the government on 
the consistency of individual foreign investment applications with 
government policy. The board has no authority to take decisions to 
approve or reject foreign investment applications. It is for the Treasurer, 
the Assistant Treasurer and the government to make decisions on cases and 
policy.... At the end of the day it is the Treasurer, the Assistant Treasurer or 
the government who makes that final decision as to whether or not [the 
proposed investment] should be allowed to proceed under the foreign 
investment policy. That is a very important part of foreign investment 
policy administration."31
28Ths mistake comes from the misconception that the FIRB is a statutory body. Its involvement in the 
reviev of large and often controversial foreign investment applications have not helped to allay this 
imprssion. A close reading of the Senate Print Media Inquiry Report Ch 7 - 10 can only lead to the 
concasion that this is an advisory body and the actual administration of the Australia's foreign investment 
polio is achieved through the FIB of Treasury.
29Seiate Print Media Inquiry para 8.3, p i93.
30Firt Assistant Secretary, Investment and Debt Division and Executive Member Foreign Investment 
Revi w Board.
31Seiate Print Media Inquiry para 8.5, p l94  - 5.
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8The FIRB is composed of four members. Three members come from either the 
business community or the community in general. The fourth member is the head of the 
FIB. He is referred to as 'the executive member' and is a First Assistant Secretary within 
the Department of Treasury. Australia's foreign investment policy is set out in the FAT 
Act, Ministerial statements and Departmental publications. However new policy or 
changes to old policy are generally communicated by press release.
The FIRB, being a non-statutory board, is not referred to in the FAT Act or any 
other legislation controlling foreign investment. This allows the FIRB to adopt informal 
processes for meetings. This has been done to enhance the ffee-flow of discussion and 
exchange of views.32
The processing of an application through the FIB review process is described in 
the accompanying chart (headed 'The FIRB process')33. There are matters in this chart 
which require comment.
The supply of commercial-in confidence information to the FIB in an application 
has meant that 'all information provided ... by foreign investors is treated in strict 
confidence' .34 No details of this information are disclosed unless prior permission from the 
applicant is obtained. The FIB claims that in most normal applications the views of other 
relevant Commonwealth and State departments and agencies are obtained. These views 
plus those of the parties opposing the application or who are affected by the investment 
are forwarded to the Treasurer. It is unclear whether a rival domestic bidder is actually 
informed that a proposal is before the FIRB. The Senate Print Media Inquiry highlighted 
the fact that there appeared to be confusion within the FIB and the FIRB as to whether 
domestic bids should be reviewed along with foreign bids.35 There is no reference to any 
procedure for confirming that there is a foreign applicant involved in the bidding or for a
32Senate Print Media Inquiry para 8.13, pl97: evidence of Mr T. Hinton to the Inquiry.
33Chart 8.1 Senate Print Media Inquiry p203.
34Senate Print Media Inquiry para 8.29, p201 
35Senate Print Media Inquiry para 8.30 - 8.34, p201 - 204
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The FIRB Process
Parties may discuss Proposal 
with the Treasurer or the 
Assistant Treasurer
The Proposal
Submission of the proposal to 
FIRB or its Executive
FIRB Advice
Early consultation with FIRB 
Executive may occur. Advice 
about conformity with 
guidelines/policy may be given.
Confidentiality
All material provided in strict confidence. 
Access to third parties barred except where 
provider's consent is first obtained
FIRB Information
Interested foreign investor 
obtains copy of Australia's 
Foreign Investment Policy - A 
guide to Investors
Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Where appropriate consoltation 
with Commonwealth and State 
Governments Statutory Agencies
Proposal referred to the relevent sectionwithin the Foreign Investment Review Branch of the 
Treasury handling case work to prepare the first draft report
The Report
Following evaluation by the FIRB Executive, a report is prepared which 
contains comments, conclusions and recommendations.
________________________ ±______________________
Depending on the type of application, the following occurs.
FIRB considers "significant' 
proposals
Parties notified of decision (Reasons need 
not be given) by the Treasurer or 
Assistant Treasurer
Recommendation forwarded to the 
Treasurer or Assistant Treasurer for 
approval or rejection
"Less significant' cases not 
covered by delegation forwarded 
by the Executive Member to the 
Treasurer or Assistant Treasurer 
for approval or rejection
Approval
Decisions taken by the Executive 
Member, Branch or Section Head on 
certain proposals under delegated 
responsibility
No formal appeal mechanism Some information under FOI Act
9domestic bidder to make enquires. Even quite simple enquires directed to the FIB are the 
subject of excessive secrecy. The evidence given by Mr P.A. Chadwick36, representing the 
Communication Law Centre, to the Senate Print Media Inquiry exposes a typical response 
from the FIB:
"What troubled us at times was that we would get answers like 'This is 
awkward and confidential and no, I cannot confirm or deny the existence of 
an application in this matter, notwithstanding that it is notorious in the 
press'."37
This excessive secrecy remains in place long after the information contained in the 
application has lost its commercial sensitivity.38
The reasons for the Treasurer's decision are not notified to the parties to an 
application. Parties to the application may seek reasons where a proposal is rejected or an 
explanation of the conditions imposed on the application. The FAT Act does not provide 
for any appeal from the decision of the Treasurer. The applicant may resubmit a modified 
application or resubmit on the basis of additional information, should the applicant wish to 
proceed further.39
Foreign investment applications are very rarely rejected. In 1994-95 4,815 
applications were lodged with only 72 being rejected. Of those 72 rejections all but three 
were for applications for investment into the residential real estate sector.40 Forty-seven 
applications were approved subject to conditions. The conditions imposed were in two 
main categories:
"[Tjhose designed to protect the environment, and those designed to 
protect the tax base by ensuring that agencies of foreign governments do 
not claim sovereign immunity in relation to Australian taxes and charges."41
36Victorian Coordinator, Communications Law Centre: see List of Witnesses Senate Print Media Inquiry 
Appendices 17
37Senate Print Media Inquiry para 8.36, p205 
38Senate Print Media Inquiry para 8.36 - 8.40, p205 - 206 
39Senate Print Media Inquiry para 8.35, p204 - 205
40Foreign Investment Review Board Report 1994 - 95, AGPS, Canberra 1996 page 29. Eight 
divestiture orders were issued in this period.
41Foreign Investment Review Board Report 1994 - 95, AGPS, Canberra 1996 page 14
n
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The FAT Act - Review By Outside Agencies
The FAT Act and its administrators have been subject to very little review by any 
outside agency42. There may be a number of reasons for this:
(1) The width o f the discretion given to the Treasurer under the FAT Act by the 
phrase 'contrary to the national interest'.43
The Treasurer's discretion under the FAT Act appears unlimited. However, all 
discretions are subject to the limitations of the Act which creates the discretion. Deciding 
what is or is not in the national interest provides enormous latitude for determining which 
particular issues will and will not be taken into account in the decision making process. 
National economic issues are no doubt the most important determinants; however, issues 
such as the environment, employment, compliance with domestic anti-monopoly legislation 
and the perceived appropriate levels o f Australian ownership are also relevant Therefore, 
any applicant trying to fix the limits o f the concept of national interest faces an almost 
impossible task.
Matters considered to be in the national interest are determined by the government 
from time to time. These matters are usually published by way of media release. The policy 
is stated in general terms, which makes the policy very fluid. Foreign business owners 
wishing to involve themselves in the Australian economy must comply with the terms of 
this policy. However the fluidity in policy allows for major applications for investment and 
acquisition to be judged on the merits o f the application, and not just on compliance with 
an existing policy. The reasons for a constant review of national interest include shifting 
economic and political conditions which prevail at the time.
42Senate Print Media Inquiry found that there had been no review of the practices of the FIRB through its 
whole existence. This even included the Australian Auditor General's Office. See Senate Print Media 
Inquiry paras 9.2 - 9.6 p 213 - 214
43The phrase "contrary to the national interest" is used throughout the FAT Act, as the test the Treasurer 
must apply to make a decision in relation to an application to acquire (see s i 8(2), s i 9(2), s20(2) s21(2) 
and s21A(2).) When divestiture of assets is required the same test is used (see sl8(3), sl9(3), s20(3), 
s21(3) and s21A(4)).
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"Administration o f policy is based on guidelines rather than inflexible rules."44 The 
FAT Act is designed to allow the Treasurer to screen the flow o f foreign investment into 
Australia. Successive Treasurers have regarded their discretion under the FAT Act as 
being one of a purely political nature.45 The national interest test reflects successive 
Governments thinking in relation to foreign investment 'that foreign direct investment [is] 
typically of benefit to the recipient economy'46 Since foreign investment is perceived as a 
direct benefit to the Australian economy, Treasurers may be forgiven for thinking that they 
had a free hand to make decisions under the FAT Act. Foreign investment policy in 
Australia has always identified particular sectors of the economy for 'special consideration 
and specific rules'.47 Changes to foreign investment policy have been made by 
administrative fiat rather than through legislation.48
(2) Perceived political or commercial implication o f attempting to review or 
overturn the Treasurer's decision.
The commercial and political consequences of any challenge may be considerable. 
Commercially it could be disadvantageous to bring commercially sensitive material before 
a Court in judicial review proceedings. The proceedings may reveal the intended nature of 
the investment, proposed financing, anticipated market demographics and share and 
marketing strategies etc. Although confidential material can be protected in hearings, not 
all material may be able to be protected. Even the release of a small amount o f sensitive 
material may be enough for a competitor to analyse the intended investment and develop
44Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy: A Guide to Investors AGPS Canberra 1992 - Statement of 
Treasurer John Dawkins p v.
45See Australia's Foreign Investment Policy: A Guide to Investors AGPS Canberra 1989 - Statement of 
Treasurer Paul Keating p v. Australia's Foreign Investment Policy: A Guide to Investors AGPS 
Canberra 1992- Statement of Treasurer John Dawkins p v. Statement of John Kerin, former Treasurer, to 
the Senate Print Media Inquiry para 3.173 p 88. The Senate Print Media Inquiry described the 
interpretation of the 'national interest' as some sort o f" 'moveable feast' depending upon who occupies the 
Treasurer's chair, "(para 3.174 p 89) The opinion of others who gave evidence to the Senate Print Media 
Inquiry appear in para 3.173 p 88 - 89 
^Senate Print Media Inquiry para 7.22 p 179
47Australia's Foreign Investment Policy, A Guide to Investors AGPS, Canberra, 1992, p 6 
48Senate Print Media Inquiry para 8.27
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counter market strategies. The F1RB in its annual reports and before the Senate Print 
Media Inquiry has justified the strict confidentiality imposed on commercial material on 
the basis of the sensitivity of the material supplied and the need to maintain faith with the 
foreign investment review process.49
The time taken in getting a hearing where judicial review is sought may influence 
the applicants. The investment may lose its competitive edge if court action is required.
It may not be in the political interest o f an applicant to challenge the decision of the 
Treasurer. The culture of secrecy which is associated with the administration of the FAT 
Act makes an applicant wary o f possible bias against a future application. In order to 
maintain a relationship with the government and its officials, it may be preferable for an 
applicant not to oppose any decision of refusal or the imposition of conditions. Also the 
Treasury staff are unable, because of constraints on their numbers, to properly police 
compliance with conditions when they are imposed on an application.50 This fact may 
influence an applicant to accept the conditions imposed but not comply with the conditions 
in the expectation that the compliance will never be monitored.
(3) The excessive secrecy which surrounds the administration of the FAT Act.
There is excessive secrecy surrounding both the administration of the foreign
investment policy and the material supplied to the FIB with an application. If an applicant 
disputes the decision-making process, the applicant finds that there is very limited access to 
information on the processes relating to the application and the final decision.
(4) There are often no formal reasons given explaining why the application has been
rejected or why certain conditions are imposed.
49See The Foreign Investment Review Board Report 1990 - 1991 AGPS Canberra 1992 p 8. The 
Senate Print Media Inquiry para 8.36
50In the Foreign Investment Review Board Report 1994 - 95, AGPS, Canberra 1996 at page 6 the 
Board noted a resolve to monitor the compliance of conditions especially in the residential real estate 
sector.
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Reasons do not have to be given for a decision to reject an application. Although an 
applicant may seek reasons for rejection51, the Treasurer's reasons for the decision do not 
have to be given to the applicant.
An applicant may also seek an explanation o f the meaning of conditions which are 
attached to an approval. As the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (the 
AD(JR) Act) does not apply to the FAT Act an applicant cannot obtain reasons by way of 
s i3.52 Compliance with the conditions imposed on an application is impossible to 
substantiate, as the conditions imposed are not publicly available. The FIB releases no 
information concerning compliance. Enforcement of divestiture orders relating to the 
purchase o f urban land has occurred recently.53
(5) The involvement of FIB staff as facilitators o f the application process.
FIB staff assist applicants to formulate their applications so that the applications 
conform to current government policy. This assistance precludes the situation where the 
applicant may be forced to challenge the Treasurer's decision.
(6) There is no formal appeal process.
No formal method of appeal from the decisions of the Treasurer exists. Review 
under s39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 is available; however, as later discussion in this work 
will show there are pitfalls.54 An applicant, should he or she wish to proceed with the 
application, must withdraw the application and resubmit it so that it conforms with the 
policy requirements.
(7) Nobody has ever been dissatisfied with the decision o f the Treasurer.
5 Evidence to the Senate Print Media Inquiry suggests that when an applicant seeks an explanation for the 
rejection of an application, an explanation is given. An explanation is also given of any conditions that are 
imposed. See Senate Print Media Inquiry para 8.35
52The FAT Act is listed in Schedule 1 of the AD(JR) Act as being an Act to which the AD(JR) Act does 
not apply.
53In the Foreign Investment Review Board Report 1994 - 95, AGPS, Canberra 1996 at page 29 the 
report notes that eight divestitures were ordered in the period to which the report applies. All the 
divestitures occured in the residential real estate sector.
54Australian Financial Review February 16 1994 - claimed that the only ground of review available to an 
applicant was error of law.
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It is unlikely that this statement is true. There have been applicants who have not 
been satisfied with the Treasurer's decision. However, until the decision in Leisure & 
Entertainment Pty Ltd v Willis there had been no direct challenge to a decision of the 
Treasurer in the courts. Collateral action by the use of the Freedom of Information Act 
1982 (Cth) (the FOI Act) had been the only form of action against the Treasurer's 
decisions. This is a very limited form of action.
It is also clear from the press and the evidence before the Senate Print Media 
Inquiry that not all the decisions of the Treasurer are satisfactory to those who may be 
affected by them including direct competitors, parties who could be affected by the 
takeovers and the community at large.
Inevitable Outcome: Disputes involving National Interest
The Senate Print Media Inquiry provided the first external review of the FIRB and 
of the Australian Government's foreign investment policy. The inquiry took as a specific 
term of reference the takeover of John Fairfax Ltd by the interests of Conrad Black. 
Findings in the report o f the Senate Print Media Inquiry are used to provide examples of 
the workings of the FIRB when required later in this work. However, it must be 
remembered that takeovers in the media sector are not examinable under the FAT Act, but 
are still notifiable to the FIRB under government policy.55 The FIRB minute of the 5th 
December 1991 prepared by Mr F.G.H. Pooley56 provides some insight into the workings 
of the FIRB and the advice it might give to the Treasurer.
The history o f this particular acquisition is as follows. The Fairfax Group went into 
receivership in December 1990. Three groups of investors tried to gain control of the 
Fairfax Group. The groups of investors were (1) INP Consortium Ltd: controlled via 
Independent Newspapers PLC by the O'Rerlly family of Ireland; (2) Tourang: a
55Australia's Foreign Investment Policy, A Guide to Investors AGPS, Canberra, 1992, p 3 
56Senate Print Media Inquiry Appendix G Appendices 77-91
1 A
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consortium of Mr Kerry Packer's Consolidated Press (who later withdrew), Mr Conrad 
Black's Daily Telegraph (a Canadian national) and the USA based Heilman and Friedman 
Investment House; and (3) Australian Independent Newspapers Limited (AIN) a 
Melbourne based syndicate, backed by AMP, National Mutual and other local 
institutions.57
The FIRB minute reviews the two foreign proposals - (1) and (2) -making 
observations on the financial stability o f the bid, holdings o f each of the bidding 
companies, the structure o f the bid, the ability of each bidder to complete the takeover and 
then maintain and run the Fairfax Group. The foreign investment policy in relation to 
takeovers in the print media is then set out. Reference is made here to the fact that all 
applications are to be judged on a case by case basis. The minute highlights the political 
implications of the policy by noting that caucus requires a limit of 20 per cent foreign 
ownership of local newspapers. There is a clear political will to keep foreign ownership in 
newspapers below 20 per cent. The question o f foreign control was seen as being of 
crucial importance.58
The FIRB minute draws a distinction between the literal legal effect of the
transaction, where there is still less than the required shareholdings to have foreign
control, and the actual commercial effect of the decision, where actual control passes to
the foreign interest. The minute reads:
"Both bids are examinable under the Act and could be blocked under the 
Act were you to decide that the control of Fairfax would pass to foreign 
hands (essentially Dr O'Reilly or Mr Black), and that this would be contrary 
to the national interest. If you were predisposed to reject either bid, the 
question of'foreign control' assumes crucial importance".59
The FIRB minute shows that consultations took place between interested 
government agencies. In this instance the Trade Practices Commission was consulted
57Senate Print Media Inquiry Appendix G Appendices 79 
58Senate Print Media Inquiry Appendix G Appendices 79-83 
59Senate Print Media Inquiry Appendix G Appendices 84
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about its interest in Mr Packer. The involvement of Mr Packer was seen to raise national 
interest questions relating to the concentration of media ownership and the cross media 
ownership rules. Other issues raised were editorial independence, management style, the 
continued maintenance of the Fairfax group and the likely effect on media concentration in 
Australia.60
The "Options" section of the FIRB minute is the only section that contains any 
comment on the domestic bidder AIN. The AIN bid was seen to be undesirable as AIN 
had limited experience in the management of newspapers. The management skills that 
were available to the two foreign bidders were expected to make the Fairfax press more 
competitive. The FIRB can be seen to be promoting the case for the creditors of Fairfax 
who might lose repayments because o f the lowered value of the bid of AIN if the two 
foreign bidders were stopped from bidding.61
The FIRB summarised its position in relation to the bids as:
"Both bids would bring a new major player (replacing the Fairfax family) 
and valuable newspaper expertise to the Australian media. While there is 
some community concern about foreign ownership of local newspapers per 
se, each bid is consistent with the key proposition of the Caucus resolution, 
and would at least maintain the existing degree of competition and 
diversity."62
The two foreign bidders are said to have complied with caucus policy. The FIRB 
interpreted caucus policy to be a 20 per cent limit on the level o f foreign voting equity. 
Any extension of the level of foreign voting equity beyond the 20 per cent level was 
unacceptable to caucus, however the FIRB only saw this as a desirable objective.63 It is 
interesting to note that Caucus policy is mentioned far more frequently than is government 
policy. This may be a reflection of the political reality of the time.64
60Senate Print Media Inquiry Appendix G Appendices 85-86 
61 Senate Print Media Inquiry Appendix G Appendices 86-87 
62Senate Print Media Inquiry Appendix G Appendices 87.
63 Senate Print Media Inquiry Appendix G Appendices 84
64Senate Print Media Inquiry Appendix G Appendices 87. Throughout the minute reference is made to 
caucus policy. This may reflect the importance the backbench of the Labor Party had exerted on 
Government media policy up until the time of the takeover by Conrad Black
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The conclusions and recommendations section also highlights precautions taken by 
the FIRB to provide the Treasurer with advice that would avoid any challenges to his 
decision:
"If you reject both bids, we would need to discuss with you whether this 
should be done under the Act or the policy guidelines (we cannot predict 
whether the parties would challenge a rejection under the Act in court: they 
would claim you were mistaken in concluding control would be foreign, 
and your decision was wrongly based; you would need to show control 
would be foreign and against the national interest) " .65
The conclusions and recommendations section reviews the proposals in the light of 
their economic impact on the nation. In this case two board members advised rejection on 
the basis that effective control o f the Fairfax Group would go to foreigners. The other two 
members recommended the bids be accepted because there would be more expertise 
brought to management, better quality journalism and more modem technology as a result 
o f the acceptance of the bids.
This minute is enlightening as it shows the type o f advice which is tendered to the 
Treasurer. It is clear that the Treasurer's decision is his alone to make. It is also clear that 
the FIRB examines applications after collecting information from a variety of sources. The 
minute also highlights the 'one off nature of each application.
65Senate Print Media Inquiry Appendix G Appendices 88- The implication of this distinction is not 
altogether clear. Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, A Guide to Investors states at p 7 that all 
takeovers in the media are subject to review but are not subject to the operation of the FAT Act. This 
means that all applications are going to be reviewed in line with Government policy. The FAT Act would 
exclude some transactions as they would fall below the thresholds established by the FAT Act. Those 
transactions which are within the terms of the FAT Act would be subject to the strictures of the FAT Act.
1 H
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Chapter 2
Review of the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 
The FAT Act: A Short Analysis.
As the name suggests the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act regulates the 
acquisition or takeover o f corporations and businesses in Australia by persons designated 
as 'foreign persons' or by foreign corporations. This section is designed to give the reader 
an overview of:
1. the workings of the FAT Act; and
2. the effect on persons and corporations subject to the provisions of the 
FAT Act.
The FAT Act is intricate in its workings and its applications. However, there has been 
limited litigation of the provisions of the FAT Act.66 It must also be noted that 
applications to the Treasurer for a determination under the FAT Act are very rarely 
rejected.67
The FAT Act is divided into three parts:
(1) Preliminary: This part defines the terms used in the operative part of 
the FAT Act (si - s i7);
(2) Control of Takeovers and Other Transactions: This is the operative 
part o f the FAT Act and sets out those transactions which will be subject to 
the provisions of the Act (si 8 - s28);
(3) Miscellaneous: This part deals with the ancillary matters, eg offences, 
criminal defences and anti-avoidance provisions (s30 - s39).
66Litigation of the provisions of the FAT Act has never been directly related to the meaning of specific 
provisions of the Act. Leisure & Entertainment Ptv Ltd v Willis No QG 204 of 1995 was the first atttempt 
at a direct challenge to a decision of the Treasurer.
67See discussion on page 9
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The provisions of the FAT Act target five types of transaction:
a. Acquisitions or Takeovers by acquisition of shares - si 8;
b. Acquisition of assets - si 9;
c. Arrangements relating to directorates o f corporations - s20;
d. Arrangements relating to the control of an Australian business - s21;
and
e. Acquisitions of an interest in Australian urban land - s21 A.
Section 18: An example of the workings of the FAT Act.
Section 18(2) empowers the Treasurer to prohibit the acquisition of shares, 
proposals to acquire shares and proposals to issue shares in certain circumstances. The 
Treasurer may exercise his power where a corporation, although not controlled by a 
foreign person, would, as a consequence of the proposal, be controlled by a foreign 
person.68 Section 18 applies to the following parties:
(i) the corporation whose shares it is proposed to acquire or are being
acquired;
(ii) the person who proposes to acquire the shares, and
(iii) the foreign person, who as a result of the proposed acquisition would
control the corporation.
Further comment is required on certain aspects of si 8:
Proposals to acquire shares: This applies to the acquisition of shares, proposals to 
acquire shares and a corporation preparing to issue shares.69 A person proposing to acquire
68The Treasurer may, where a corporation is already controlled by a foreign person or persons and the 
corporation would continue to be controlled by foreign persons, and there is an alteration in the ownership 
or control of the corporation by including a person who is not already a person in control or excluding a 
person already in control, treat this change as if it were an acquisition under s i 8(2).
69A person proposing to acquire shares or assets is defined in s5(3) as:
(/') a person making an offer;
(/'/) a person making or publishing a statement that in anyway invites a holder of shares 
or assets to dispose of them;
(iii) a person taking part in or proposing to take part in negotiations with a view to 
acquisition of shares and assets.
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shares includes a person making an offer, persons inviting shareholders to dispose of 
assets and people taking part in or proposing to take part in negotiations to purchase 
shares. Therefore the number of transactions that si 8 can apply to is considerable.
Corporations: For a corporation to come within the terms of si 8 it must be a 
prescribed corporation that carries on an Australian business or be a holding corporation. 
A prescribed corporation is defined as a (i) a trading corporation; (ii) a financial 
corporation; (iii) a corporation incorporated under Territory laws; or (iv) a foreign 
corporation restricted by the terms of sl3(d),(e),(f),(g)&(h).70
Although the corporation may be a prescribed corporation it may also be an 
exempt corporation.71 For a company to be an exempt corporation it must first be a 
prescribed company with Australian assets where the total of those assets does not exceed 
$5 million or if more than 50 per cent of the assets is attributable to Australian rural land 
the threshold is reduced to $3 million.72 The term Australian business refers to a business 
carried on in Australia for profit or gain.73 Any one who holds a mineral right in Australia 
is deemed to be carrying on a business in Australia.74 However, conducting business with 
a government or a corporation constituted for a public purpose is deemed not to be 
carrying on a business under the FAT Act.75
70These subsections cover foreign corporations which have:
(1) assets of more than $20 million which consist of all or part of any
(a) land situated in Australia (both legal and equitable title),
(b) mineral rights,
(c) shares in corporations incorporated in Australia;
(2) a foreign corporation which has Australian subsidiaries where the consolidated assets are 
more than $20 million;
(3) a foreign corporation which has a subsidiary which is also foreign and which holds assets 
referred to in (l)(a) - (c);
(4) a foreign corporation with or without Australian subsidiaries where the consolidated assets are not less 
than one half the value of the consolidated assets of the foreign corporation (and its subsidiaries, if  any). 
71FAT A ctsl3 A  
72FAT Act sl3A (4)
73FAT Act s7(l)
74FAT Act s7(2)
75FAT Act s7(3)
or»
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Foreign Persons: A natural person who is not ordinarily resident in Australia for
less than 200 days in the 12 months preceding the application is defined as being a foreign
person.76 Where the foreign person is a corporation other factors apply. For a corporation
to be controlled by a foreign person, the natural person must not be ordinarily resident in
Australia and, the person, in company with associates,77 must control 15% or more of the
issued shares or voting rights of the corporation.78 The Treasurer is able to trace through
the corporate structure to determine the true owners or controllers of the corporation and
to determine the level of control or voting power exercised by those people.79
Section 18(2) of the FAT Act reads as follows:
(2) Where the Treasurer is satisfied that-
(a) a person proposes, or persons propose, to acquire shares in a corporation 
or a corporation proposes to issue shares;
(b) the proposed acquisition or acquisitions or the proposed issue would have 
the result that -
(i) in the case of a corporation not controlled by foreign persons - the 
corporation would be controlled by foreign persons; or
(ii) in the case of a corporation controlled by foreign persons - the 
corporation would continue to be controlled by foreign persons, but those 
persons would include a person who is not, or would not include a person 
who is, one of the foreign persons first referred to in this sub-paragraph; 
and
(c) that result would be contrary to the national interest,
the Treasurer may make an order prohibiting the proposed acquisition of all or any 
o f the proposed acquisitions, or the proposed issue, as the case may be.
If  the transaction is one that is controlled by the FAT Act the Treasurer must now
determine whether the acquisition is "contrary to the national interest".80 There is no
definition of "contrary to the national interest" in the FAT Act to assist the Treasurer.
76FAT Act s5 and s5A
77FAT Act s6 defines who are associates
78If there are two or more natural persons then they must control an aggregate of more than 40% of the 
voting rights or issued shares. A controlling interest is defined as a substantial interest in the case of a 
single person (FAT Act s9(l)) or an aggregate substantial interest in the case of two or more foreign 
persons (FAT Act s9(2)).
79FAT Act sl2C  
80FAT Act sl8(2)(c)
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There are three options open to the Treasurer: (1) to allow the transaction to 
proceed; (2) to allow the transaction to proceed with conditions; or (3) to prohibit the 
transaction.81 If the Treasurer prohibits the transaction he is empowered, should it be 
required, to order 'specified foreign persons', either alone or in company, not to hold an 
interest in shares or in voting rights in a greater proportion than when the si 8(2) order 
became operative.82
If the sale and transfer o f the shares has been completed the Treasurer is permitted 
to order the forced disposal of shares.83 The Treasurer must satisfy himself that the sale 
and transfer is contrary to the national interest. The Treasurer is to specify in writing the 
time by which the disposal is to take place. Extensions of time may be given. The 
Treasurer may not refuse to approve a person acquiring the shares from a forced disposal, 
unless such a transaction would be contrary to the national interest.84
Sections 25 and 26. These are the notification sections and both effect s i 8 
decisions.
Section 26 relates only to si 8 transactions and makes it compulsory for an 
applicant to notify the Treasurer of the intention to enter an agreement to acquire shares. 
Failure to inform the Treasurer of an intention to enter into an agreement creates an 
offence.85 Section 26 applies to 'specific persons' viz:
(i) natural persons not ordinarily resident in Australia;
(ii) a corporation in which an Australian person not ordinarily resident has 
a controlling interest; and
81 See Re Macphee and Department of Treasury (1989) 11 AAR 166, 178 where Hartigan J found that (1) 
may not be open to the Treasurer. This may have been true in a strict legal based on the legislation as it 
was written at the time. However, the practical effect of the decision is that it allows the application to 
proceed.
82FAT Act s i 8(3). This order may also apply to any associates.
83FAT Act s i 8(4)
84FAT Act s i 8(5)
85FAT Act s26(2)(a)
O')
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(iii) a Trustee of a trust estate where a substantial interest in the estate is 
held by a foreign person.86
A further, but separate offence is created, even though notice has been given, if a person 
proceeds with the agreement before advice is given that the Commonwealth Government 
has no objection.87 The offence is not formed if the agreement is subject to a condition 
precedent.88
Two points should be noted about s26:
(a) it does apply to Australian corporations viz trading, financial or 
Territory corporations. Section 18 applies to prescribed corporations as 
defined in si 3. Therefore a smaller group of corporations is affected by the 
compulsory notifications; and
(b) it does not apply to pro rata rights issues or to the target company if it 
is an exempt corporation.
Section 25 applies to a notice given voluntarily in relation to all transactions 
subject to the provisions of the FAT Act.89 This section is directed at the Treasurer and, 
should an applicant voluntarily notify the Treasurer of his intention to acquire shares the 
Treasurer is subject to certain obligations and time limits to which he must adhere. First, a 
preliminary examination is to be completed within 30 days90 and can result in (a) a quick 
clearance or (b) an interim order prohibiting implementation of the proposal for up to 40 
days from the date of the order. Second, a detailed investigation will follow an interim 
order subject to s25(3). If a detailed investigation is required the Treasurer has up to 90 
days in which to make a decision.91 Should the Treasurer fail to inform an applicant o f his 
decision this will restrain the Treasurer from making any further orders prohibiting actions
86FAT Act s26(l)
87FAT Act s26(2)(b)
88FAT Act s26(3)
89FAT Act s25(l)
90FAT Act s25(2) and (3)
91FAT Act s25(3)
O '*
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taken under relevant provisions92 in relation to the transaction. The applicant is restrained 
from proceeding further with the transaction until such time as the Treasurer 
communicates his decision or the time for the Treasurer to make his decision has 
elapsed.93
The Treasurer may consent to the transaction and may do so with or without 
conditions 94 These conditions are to be such that the proposal will not be contrary to the 
national interest. Failure to comply with the conditions is an offence.95 Should a person or 
a corporation be convicted of an offence, the Treasurer is entitled to order divestiture of 
the shares.96 The Treasurer may not order divestiture at a later date, if no conditions have 
been imposed or the conditions imposed have been fulfilled.
The other operative provisions, si 9, s20, s21 and s21 A, are all o f a similar 
structure to si 8. The Treasurer is able to order the divestiture of assets,97 the 
rearrangement o f the constituent documents98 and the control of a business to be returned 
as far as is possible to Australian ownership.99 Voluntary notification of an intention to do 
one of the acts referred to in sections 19, 20 and 21 may save the applicant from the 
prospect of having an order prohibiting the transaction.100 There are no compulsory 
notification provisions in relation to sections 19, 20 and 21.
Section 21A deals with applications for the purchase of urban land. Urban land is 
land not directly used in primary production.101 It is compulsory to notify the Treasurer of 
any intention to purchase urban land.102 Failure to notify constitutes an offence under the
92As FAT Act s25 applies to s i8(2), sl9(2), s20(2), s21 (2) and s21 A(2) relevant provisions refers to any 
order made in relation to of these sections. It also refers to s25(l A) conditional orders.
93FAT Act s25(2) and (3). Failure to comply may result in a criminal prosecution.
94FAT Act s25(l A)
95FAT Act s25(lC)
96FAT Act s25(lC)(d)
97FAT Act s i 9(2)
98FAT Act s20(2)
"FA T Act s21(2)
100FAT Act s25(l)
101FAT Act s5 
102FAT Act s26A
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FAT Act.103 The regulations set out a large number of transactions for the purchase of 
urban land that are exempt from review.104
The FAT Act requires that the following proposals be submitted for review:
(i) acquisitions of interests in urban real estate regardless of value...;
(ii) acquisitions of shareholdings of 15 per cent or more in Australian 
companies that have total assets valued at more than $5 million (more than 
$3 million if greater than 50 per cent of the assets of the company are in the 
form of rural land);
(iii) takeovers of Australian companies and businesses by means other than the 
acquisition o f shares, viz:
(a) by the purchase of assets or interests in assets;
(b) by agreements in relation to board representation or by alteration of 
the articles of association or other constituent documents of a 
company; or
(c) by arrangements for leasing, hiring, managing or otherwise 
participating in the profits of a business-
where the total assets of the target company or business are valued at more 
than $5 million (more than $3 million if greater than 50 per cent of the 
assets are in the form of rural land); and
(iv) takeovers o f off-shore companies that have Australian subsidiaries or assets 
valued at $20 million or more, or where the value o f the Australian 
subsidiaries or assets is more than half of the value of the global assets of 
the target company.105
There are other proposals which are submitted to the Treasurer for his 
consideration, however, these proposals are not subject to the provisions o f the FAT Act.
Such proposals fall into the following categories:
(i) any proposals in the media sector irrespective of size;
(ii) proposals to establish new business in other sectors of the economy 
where the total amount o f the investment is $10 million or more (total 
investment means the total expenditure expected to be associated with the 
proposal, including the value of any assets leased); and
(iii) direct investment by foreign governments or their agencies, regardless of 
size, (excluding investments related to their diplomatic representation).106
103FAT Act s26A(2)
104Foreign Acquisitions And Takeovers Regulations reg 3 
105Australia's Foreign Investment Policy, p2 
106 Australia's Foreign Investment Policy, p3
o c
Government policy allows for certain proposals not to be examined or required to 
comply with the national interest criteria. These proposals fall into the following 
categories:
(a) the acquisition o f 15 per cent or more of a company or a business valued 
by total assets and consideration below $50 million;
(b) the establishment of a new project or business with a total investment 
below $50 million; and
(c) the takeover o f an off-shore company with Australian subsidiaries or assets 
valued below $50 million and not exceeding half the global asset value.107
107Australia's Foreign Investment Policy, p4
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Chapter 3
Obtaining Information From the FIRB
Effective external review depends on the person who seeks the review being able 
to obtain information about the process of the making of a particular decision. Apart from 
discovery108, there are two possible ways to obtain information from the FIRB. The first is 
by the common law and the second by application for information under the Freedom of 
Information Act.
The Common Law
An attempt was made by Kirby P in the New South Wales Court o f Appeal to 
establish a common law duty on administrators to give reasons. 109 This was rejected by the 
High Court in Public Service Board O f New South Wales v Osmond . 110 The Court found 
that there was no general rule of common law, or principle of natural justice, that requires 
reasons to be given for administrative decisions, even decisions which have been made in 
the exercise of a statutory discretion and which may adversely affect the interests or defeat 
the legitimate expectations o f those who are the subject of the decision. * 111 
Freedom of Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act (the FOI Act) creates a legally enforceable right 
to obtain access to documents from Government agencies. 112 The FIB of Treasury and the 
FIRB are agencies for the purposes o f the FOI Act . 113 Therefore the FIRB is susceptible 
to an application for access to a document in its possession. (For the purposes of this
108Discovery is not considered further as it only applies to obtaining information after an action has been 
commenced. This limits the effectiveness of discovery.
109Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond [ 1984] 3 NSWLR 447
110 (1986) 63 ALR 559
111 Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656, 662 - 3 per Gibbs CJ 
112FOI Act s i 1; this includes the official documents of Ministers
113FOI Act s4: Agency means a Department, prescribed authority ... as defined.
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section o f the work FIRB refers to both the FIRB and the FIB of Treasury unless 
otherwise stated.)
Section 11 creates a legally enforceable right to obtain access to documents of an 
agency that are not exempt documents. Part IV of the FOI Act sets out the provisions that 
relate to exempt documents. The decided cases reveal that the FIRB has succeeded and 
continues to use all the available exemptions to withhold documents.
Section 7 exempts a number of agencies from applications to access of the 
agencies documents. These agencies are listed in Schedule 2. The FIRB is not listed and is 
therefore not exempt. The FIRB has, however, attempted to claim that a total exemption 
is applicable to all documents in its possession. In Re Lordsvale Finance and Department 
of Treasury No3, Deputy President Todd put an end to such a claim.114 It is not for the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) or the Courts to give an exemption which the 
Parliament has not given.115 If a document is exempt, then an exemption must be found 
within the provisions of the FOI Act. Any document that does not attract one o f the 
exemptions is susceptible to release.
The exemption in s36 has figured prominently in the decisions concerning the 
FIRB. This section exempts from release any document that the FIRB can establish 
contains advice, opinion or recommendations obtained or prepared as part of the 
deliberative processes of the FIRB116, where, in relation to the document its disclosure 
would not be in the public interest.117 The exemption does not apply to "purely factual
114(1986 - 87) 12 ALD 445 The claim for total exemption was made in submissions in relation to s58(5) 
of the FOI Act: namely whether "there exist reasonable grounds for the claim that the disclosure of the 
document would be contrary to the public interest".
115(1986 - 87) 12 ALD 445 para 4 "I do not think it is proper for this Tribunal, under the umbrella of the 
"public interest", to uphold blanket claims of exemption for all documents in the possession of certain 
agencies without reference to the contents, or to the nature of the contents, of those documents. To do this 
would be tantamount to the Tribunal conferring upon an agency, or in this case a section thereof, the 
immunity afforded by Schedule 2 despite Parliament not having seen fit to do so. The Tribunal is not the 
Legislature and it must resist the temptation to expedient to cure perceived or suggested defects or 
omissions in legislation."
116FOI Act s36(l)(a)
117The onus remains on the FIRB to show that the document is one exempted by s36(l)(a). FOI Act s61.
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material" contained in a document118, nor does it apply to a formal statement of the 
reasons for a decision119 or a record of a final decision.120 Section 36(1 )(a) protects from 
disclosure documents which were prepared in the process of arriving at a decision.
The FIRB prepares a memorandum of advice for the Treasurer on each 
application. These memoranda set out the opinion of the FIRB on the merits of each 
application. At the end of the memorandum the Treasurer is asked to accept or reject the 
proposal.121 It would seem that the memorandum prepared by the FIRB and forwarded to 
the Treasurer for approval may form part of the decision. Therefore, an applicant for 
access to information may be entitled to obtain the conditions imposed on an applicant to 
invest, as the conditions may form part of the final decision.122
In Re Macphee and Department of Treasury123. Hartigan J was asked to release 
the FIRB memorandum to the Treasurer in relation to the takeover of the Herald and 
Weekly Times Newspapers by News Corporation. In one part the opinion of the AAT 
rests on the interpretation of the words 'final decision' in s36(6)(c). Hartigan J found that 
the Treasurer only has power to make an order prohibiting the acquisition or issue of 
shares. As a consequence the Treasurer could not make a decision accepting the 
application to acquire or invest. This part of the decision must turn on the facts and the 
statute as it was written at the time. Prior to 1989 there was no statutory provision 
permitting the imposition of conditions. Section 25(1)(A) of the FAT Act specifically 
refers to the imposition of conditions and also suggests that the Treasurer must make a 
decision as "the Treasurer may ... decide that the Commonwealth Government has no 
objection". In s26(2)(b)(ii) of the FAT Act reference is made to "the date on which advice
118FOI Act s36(5)
119FOI A cts36(6)(c)
120FOI Act s 36(6) (c)
121 See Senate Print Media Inquiry Appendix G Appendices 88
122FAT Act s24 The FAT Act requires that where the Treasurer makes an order, it must be in writing 
signed by him and publish in the Gazette within ten days of being signed to be a valid order.
123(1989) 11 AAR 166
on
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is given that the Commonwealth Government does not object to the person entering into 
the agreement (whether or not the advice is subject to conditions imposed under sub­
section s25(l)(A))". These current provisions suggest that the Treasurer or his delegate 
must make a decision.
Although Hartigan J was not convinced that the acceptance of an application to 
acquire was a decision that the Treasurer could make, he assumed that, if the Treasurer 
could make such a decision, the decision noted at the end of the memorandum was a 
decision that included all of the reasons contained in the memorandum. The question then 
is: is this a final decision and therefore is the document susceptible to release by virtue of 
s36(6)(c)7 Hartigan J found that any document that contains a decision where a condition 
is imposed is not a final decision for the purposes of the FOI Act. This is not a final 
decision because further decisions might be made if any of the conditions imposed are not 
fulfilled. This may be a reflection o f the legislation at the time. However to say that the 
decision is not final would be unrealistic. The decision is final between the parties. Both 
the parties agree that the investment or acquisition may proceed. Compliance is a separate 
issue from whether a decision is final. If the application to acquire or invest does not 
comply with the conditions imposed, the Treasurer has remedies under the FAT Act.
The second limb of a s36 exemption is the disclosure of the document being 
contrary to the public interest. The FIRB has put forward a number of general arguments 
to support its claim for exemption on this basis. The analysis that follows will include 
other possible exemption claims.
(1). It is argued that documents in the possession of the FIRB are generated by a 
statutory authority which reports direct to the Treasurer. The FIRB is an advisory body 
which gives sensitive advice to the Treasurer involving foreign investment. But the AAT 
has said that, although the FIRB gives sensitive advice to a high level of government, this
- J A
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does not of itself make the disclosure of information, contrary to the public interest.124 
This argument is a material factor but not a conclusive argument. The AAT weighs the 
right of the public to access to information as guaranteed by the FOI Act against right of 
the Government to obtain advice and consider matters in secret.125
(2). It is said that there is a need to protect information which is supplied 
voluntarily and confidentially by commercial organisations. The FIRB gives assurances 
that the information with which it is supplied will be protected. These assurances are given 
in the belief that there will be a more free and frank flow of information so that the 
information can receive proper and candid consideration. Again, when deciding whether 
the document should be released this is a material, but not a conclusive, factor.126 Apart 
from s36, exemption from release o f documents relating to business affairs is available 
under s43. The FIRB may claim the exemption without reference to the supplier of the 
information. However where the FIRB intends to grant access to the document it must 
take reasonable steps to provide the owner of the information with the opportunity to 
make submissions for the document to be exempt under s43.127
It should also be noted that information which is given in confidence is also 
exempt128, although a document which is prepared by a Minister or the staff of a Minister 
cannot be exempted under this section.129 Information given by an outside source is 
protected if it were regarded as breach of confidence.130 Evidence from those who gave 
the information in confidence which is contained in a document which was given in
124Re Lordsvale Finance and Department of Treasury No3 (1986 - 87) 12 ALD 445 para 5 Deputy 
President Todd said: " I do not consider that the fact that a document emanates from, or is directed to, a 
very senior official or a Minister can of itself make its disclosure contrary to the public interest. This is not 
how the Act works."
125FOI Act s34 On the other hand documents that are supplied to Cabinet for consideration may be 
exempt under s34
126Re Lordsvale Finance and Department of Treasury No3 (1986 - 87) 12 ALD 445 at para 6 
127FOI Act s27 
128FOI Act s45 
129FOI Act s45(2)
130FOI Act s45(l)
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confidence and under the expectation o f continuing confidentiality, may result in the non­
disclosure of the document.
(3) . It may also be argued as a s36(l)(b) factor that disclosure would prejudice the 
flow of information between government departments, both Federal and State, and the 
flow of information between Federal and State Agencies. This argument can also support 
a claim under s33A(l)(a) that documents may be exempt if they were to cause damage to 
the relations between the Commonwealth and an individual State.131 An exemption may 
also be claimed under s33A(l)(b) in relation to information communicated in confidence 
between the Government of a State and an authority o f a State to the Commonwealth.132 
These exemptions are highly relevant but the prejudice to the flow of information must be 
established. These exemptions cannot be claimed on the unsubstantiated opinion of a 
public servant or a Minister as to what may occur. A Minister must be satisfied there 
would be damage to the relations with the State.133 A ministerial certificate may also be 
issued to support this exemption.134
(4) . The FIRB also cite s36(l)(b) as an argument that people will not be candid if 
any of the information supplied to the FIRB is ever to be released. Deputy President Todd 
accepted the argument that, an agency cannot be expected to operate properly if 
information could not be received candidly from people.135 The release of a document 
cannot be restrained because o f the slight possibility that a person supplying that 
information will not be candid. The purpose of the FOI Act is to allow people access to 
government and bureaucratic decision-making. A clear reduction in candid information is a 
material argument against release, but, again it is not conclusive argument that the release 
is not in the public interest.
131FOI Act s33A(l)(a)
132FOI Act s33A(l)(b)
133Re Lordsvale Finance and Department of Treasury No3 (1986 - 87) 12 ALD 445 at para 3 
134FOI Act s33A(2)
135Re Lordsvale Finance and Department of Treasury No3 (1986 - 87) 12 ALD 445 at para 3
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The Treasurer may issue a conclusive certificate to support claims of exemption 
under s36 (and under s33, s33A, s34 and s35). A certificate establishes conclusively that 
the disclosure of the document is not in the public interest under s36(1)(b).136 Section 
58(5) of the FOI Act confers a power on the AAT to review the reasonableness of 
certificates issued pursuant to s36(3). The certificate only applies to a document which is 
of a kind stated in s36(l)(a). There is a two part process to establish the reasonableness of 
the certificate. The FTRB must establish the validity of the grounds upon which it bases its 
claim for exemption, and, then, that the grounds are reasonable, that is, that the grounds 
are not fanciful, imaginary or contrived, but are grounds which are based on reason.137 
The grounds which are argued by the FTRB are to be judged by themselves and live and 
die by themselves. They are not to be measured against competing grounds.138 The onus 
to prove that grounds are reasonable rests with the FTRB. The FTRB cannot simply rely on 
the grounds which are stated in the certificate when required to prove them. The FTRB 
must show the AAT that the grounds stated in the certificate are both true and 
reasonable.139 Each case is determined on its own facts.
An FOT application might appear to be a tool to obtain information from the FTRB, 
but the FTRB has been successful in restricting the release of information in its possession. 
The 1992 - 93 Annual Report of the FIRB shows that fourteen FOI applications were 
made. The FTRB was obliged to make a full release of information requested in three cases 
and a partial release was made in relation to six requests. This release o f information was 
done in consultation with those who supplied the information.140 The 1994 - 95 Annual 
Report shows that five FOI applications were received. None of these applications 
resulted in a full release of the documents requested. Partial release was made in respect of
136FOI Act s36(3)
137Pepartment of Industrial Relations v Burchill (1991) 33 FCR 122, 125
138Re Macphee and Department of Treasury (1989) 11 AAR 166, 173 - 174 per Hartigan J
139Re Macphee and Department of Treasury (1989) 11 AAR 166, 174
140Foreign Investment Review Board: Report 1992 - 93 AGPS Canberra 1993 page 3
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three requests. 141 The FTRB maintains that no commercially sensitive or confidential 
documents has ever been released to any FOI applicants. 142
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141Foreign Investment Review Board: Report 1994 - 95 AGPS Canberra 1996 page 6 
142Foreign Investment Review Board: Report 1992 - 93 AGPS Canberra 1993 page 3 and Foreign 
Investment Review Board: Report 1994 - 95 AGPS Canberra 1996 page 6
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Chapter 4
The FAT Act and Judicial Review 
Introduction
The only person authorised by the FAT Act to make a decision is the Treasurer.143 
Section 75(v) of The Constitution gives original jurisdiction to the High Court "[i]n which 
a writ o f Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the 
Commonwealth." Section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 gives original jurisdiction to the 
Federal Court of Australia in respect of the same matters. A Minister is an officer of the 
Commonwealth.144 The Treasurer being a Minister is therefore an officer of the 
Commonwealth. The Treasurer's decisions are therefore susceptible to judicial review. 
Decisions of the Treasurer made pursuant to the FAT Act are listed in para(h) of schedule 
1 o f the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (the AD(JR) Act) as being 
one o f the class of decisions to which the AD(JR) Act does not apply. Therefore any 
person wishing to challenge the decision of the Treasurer must use the s39B procedures 
or, as they are more commonly referred to, the prerogative writs or orders.
A Minister must use the power of discretion to promote Parliament's purpose. 145It 
is now established that a Minister's statutory discretion is able to be reviewed on all 
available judicial review grounds.
Judicial review is the only external avenue of challenge open to a person 
dissatisfied with the decision of the Treasurer. Judicial review does not provide the 
applicant with a review of the merits of the application. It is not an appeal. Judicial review 
is a review of the decision-making process. The issues raised in this chapter and the
143The Treasurer is not the only person who makes decisions in relation to the Act. The Treasurer reviews 
all applications where the value of the acquisition is above $50 million. The Assistant Treasurer reviews 
all applications for acquisition below $50 million. The Executive Member reviews all decisions that deal 
with the purchase of urban real estate. [ source Senate Print Media Inquiry paras 8.4 and 8.5,p 194] 
144Quick and Garren The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (1901),p.783 
145Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24
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succeeding chapters are relevant to both a direct and a collateral attack on the decision of 
the Treasurer.
Litigants who seek a public law remedy must establish four essential requisites 
before they will be granted the remedy they seek. The litigant must show that he or she :
1. is a litigant with standing;
2. has a justiciable matter to litigate;
3. can establish one of the grounds o f review; and
4 is entitled to the remedy that he or she seeks.
The remedies of greatest utility, given that they are relatively free of technicalities 
are the injunction and the declaration. If on an application for either or both of these 
remedies a person aggrieved can establish the first three requisites listed, there is not likely 
to be any great difficulty in the Court granting the remedy. A Court may decline these 
remedies in its discretion, but relevant factors in this context are likely to have been 
addressed in relation to the topic o f justiciabilty. (For reasons of space this topic is not 
further addressed.)
~iC.
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Chapter 5
Judicial Review - Standing
The FAT Act includes no provisions for an appeal. Discussion has already shown 
the difficulty of obtaining information by an FOl application or by the common law action 
for release of information. However, it is assumed that the prospective litigant has 
sufficient information concerning the decision-making process to bring the action. The 
litigant must therefore show that he or she has the standing to bring an action.
The rules of standing are varied and are dependent upon the remedy being sought. 
In recent years the Courts seem to have moved closer to a unified test of standing based 
on the 'special interest' test. 146 The 'special interest' test was first adopted for the equitable 
remedies of injunction and declaration. 147 This test is now being adopted for the remedies 
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The object o f these rules is twofold: first, to limit 
the number of people who can come before the Courts to enforce public rights and duties 
and prohibit public wrongs, second, to have the person most affected by the unlawful 
administrative action before the court. 148
The special interest test is a refinement of the traditional rules governing standing 
in relation to injunction and declaration. The traditional rule was that the individual had no
146The Laws of Australia: Administrative Law - Vol 2 Standing p33 para 45 The author, Merris Amos, 
claims that "There has been a movement towards the 'special interest" test for all remedies". Amos 
concludes that the decisions concerning s3(4) of the AD(JR) Act 1977 "may influence the common law 
standing tests. This test may supersede the common law and become the standard test for standing." In 
Leisure & Entertainment Ptv Ltd v Willis No QG 204 of 1995 Spender J dismissed a claim for an 
interlocutory injunction because there was no chance of obtaining standing in the principal action where 
mandamus and injunction were sought. Spender J dealt with standing for both remedies by using the 
"special interest" test.
147Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth [1980] 146 CLR 493, 527 per Gibbs J 
148The Australian courts have rejected the concept of an open system of standing: see Australian 
Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth [1980] 146 CLR 493 which was affirmed and followed in 
North Coast Environment Council Inc v Minister for Resources (1994) 127 ALR617, 627 and Right to 
Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary. Dept of Human Services and Health (1995) 128 ALR 238, 254
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Standing to seek to enforce a public legal right, or require the performance of a public 
duty, or to act to prohibit a public wrong. The only person entitled to bring these matters 
before the Courts is the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General may proceed either ex 
officio or at the relation of a private citizen. The relator action gives standing to the 
person prosecuting the action. 149
There are two exceptions to this rule, which were set out by Buckley J in Boyce v 
Paddington Borough Council: 150
"A plaintiff can sue without joining the Attorney-General in two cases: 
first, where the interference with the public right is such as that some
private right o f his is at the same time interfered w ith .... and, secondly,
where no private right is interfered with, but the plaintiff, in respect of his 
public right, suffers special damage peculiar to himself from the 
interference with the public right."
The right o f a private individual to standing is certain where that person can show 
interference with his private right at the same time as the public right. An individual whose 
private legal rights, having their source in contract, tort or statute, are affected by unlawful 
administrative action has standing to seek injunction or declaration. 151
Beyond these situations an individual has standing where a public right has been
interfered with and the individual can show that he has suffered damage peculiar to
himself. What constitutes special damage is dependent upon the facts of the case:
"Depending on the nature of the relief which he seeks a plaintiff will in 
general have a locus standi when he can show actual or apprehended injury 
or damage to his property or proprietary rights, to his business or
economic interests and perhaps to his social or political interests......The
cases are infinitely various and so much depends in a given case on the 
nature of the relief which is sought, for what is a sufficient interest in one 
case may be less than sufficient in another. " 152
Special damage is damage suffered by a person that is either damage to the interest
common to all members of the public but the effects are quantitatively greater to the
149Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth [1980] 146 CLR 493, 527 
150[ 1903] 1 Ch 109
151Boyce v Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch 109
152Australian Conservation Foundation v The Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493, 547 per Mason J
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particular person than to other members of the public, or, damage qualitatively different 
from that suffered by the public generally. Therefore, for a person to have suffered special 
damage, the damage to an individual must be over and above the damage suffered by the 
public at large, or, as is often the case, by a relevant section o f the public of which the 
applicant is a member. 153
The Special Interest Test: The rule in relation to standing for injunction and 
declaration was reformulated in Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v The 
Commonwealth154(the ACF case) by Gibbs J. His Honour found that the test for special 
damage to be confusing. Gibbs J said the test should be whether the plaintiff has a "special 
interest in the subject matter of the action" . 155 Gibbs J acknowledged that special interest 
went beyond just legal rights, but did not go as far as to allow an applicant standing who 
had a mere intellectual belief or concern. Therefore individuals who have financial or 
proprietary interests satisfy the special interest test.
The Court156 found against the ACF for two reasons. The first reason had regard 
to the nature of the interests that were at stake. Special interest is not a special interest if 
the interest is merely an intellectual or emotional concern with the subject matter. The 
person must be gaining an advantage not simply the satisfaction o f righting a wrong, 
upholding a principle or winning a contest if the action succeeds, or, must be suffering 
some disadvantage other than a sense of grievance or debt of costs. 157 Beliefs, however 
strongly held, that certain laws or parts of laws should be enforced do not give a person
153The Function of Standing Rules in Administrative Law: Peter Cane [1980] PL 302, 313 
154(1980) 146 CLR493, 527
155(1980) 146 CLR 493, 527. Many of the cases referred to in this section of the work relate to the "person 
aggrieved" test used in s3(4) of the AD(JR) Act. The Courts use the ACF case as the basis for interpreting 
the meaning of the phrase. The ACF case was a case decided in relation to the rules of standing for 
injunction and declaration prior to the introduction of the AD(JR) Act.
156The ACF case was decided by a three to one majority with Gibbs J, Stephen and Mason JJ in the 
majority and Murphy J dissenting.
157Australian Conservation Foundation v The Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493, 530 per Gibbs J see 
also 539 per Stephen J and 548 per Mason J
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standing.158 Second, participation in the initial or primary decision-making process by the 
ACF was not appropriate in this instance to ground standing. A distinction was drawn 
between a rule which has the status of policy and a right which is gained from the 
procedure having been established under delegated legislation.159
In Leisure & Entertainment Ptv Ltd v Willis160, the Federal Court addressed the 
question of the standing o f an individual to prosecute an action against the decision of the 
Treasurer made under the FAT Act. The Plaintiff was found to have no special interest as 
defined in the case. Leisure & Entertainment Pty Ltd was attempting to purchase 
Dreamworld. A contract o f sale for Dreamworld had been entered into by the Receivers of 
Dreamworld and Janola Dale Pty Ltd (a foreign person as defined by the FAT Act). The 
contract was conditional upon Janola Dale Pty Ltd seeking approval from the Treasurer 
that the purchase complied with the requirements of the FAT Act. Leisure &
Entertainment Pty Ltd had influenced the Treasurer to review the purchase of 
Dreamworld by Janola Dale Pty Ltd. The Treasurer issued a 90 day review order in order 
to review the purchase under si 9(1), s21 A (l) and s22 of the FAT Act. The reason for 
these orders was explained by the Treasurer in two press releases dated the 20th and 21st 
December 1995. The Treasurer said that approval to proceed with the purchase would be 
given with certain conditions to Janola Dale Pty Ltd unless Leisure & Entertainment Pty 
Ltd entered into a contract o f sale with the Receivers on substantially the same conditions 
as with Janola Dale Pty Ltd prior to the 29th December 1995. The Receivers were in no 
position to enter into such a contract with Leisure & Entertainment Pty Ltd because of a 
prior contract which existed between themselves and Janola Dale Pty Ltd. To abandon the
158Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary. Dept of Human Services and Health (1995) 128 ALR 
238
159Australian Conservation Foundation v The Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493, 531 per Gibbs J and 
541 per Stephen J. This puts the ACF case in conflict with Sinclair v Mining Warden at Maryborough 
(1975) 132 CLR 473 where the plaintiff had standing to seek mandamus against the mining warden as a 
result of participating in the hearing under the Mining Regulations.
160No QG 204 of 1995
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contract with Janola Dale Pty Ltd would have exposed the Receivers to a large claim for 
damages. Leisure & Entertainment Pty Ltd sought an interlocutory injunction pending the 
hearing of an application for an injunction restraining the Treasurer from approving the 
application and an order for a writ o f mandamus to issue directing the Treasurer to refuse 
the application by Janola Dale Pty Ltd.
Spender J found Leisure & Entertainment Pty Ltd had no standing. His Honour 
was influenced initially to find that Leisure & Entertainment Pty Ltd had standing because 
the two press releases issued by the Treasurer specifically referred to Leisure & 
Entertainment Pty Ltd and the principal, Mr Palmer. However, the contract which the 
Treasurer recommended was never obtained. His Honour concluded that Leisure & 
Entertainment Pty Ltd had no standing since its position in regard to the required contract 
was no different whether the two press releases had been issued or not.
Spender J closely examined and relied upon the competitor cases of Australian 
Agricultural Company v Oatmount Pty Ltd161 and Yates Security Services Ptv Ltd v 
Keating. 162 Both these cases saw a competitor trying to use public law remedies to obtain 
a competitive and commercial advantage. Both cases resulted in standing not being 
granted to the plaintiffs.
Spender J noted in his decision the submission of Mr J McGill QC, counsel for the
Treasurer, that only a limited function was given to the Treasurer by the FAT Act:
"Where there is a particular proposed acquisition which he is satisfied is 
contrary to the national interest, he may prohibit it or impose conditions so 
as to prevent its being contrary to the national interest.
Subject to that, everyone is free to sell their property as they wish. It is no 
part of the Treasurer's function to decide that a vendor is to sell to one 
person rather than another, or to interfere in commercial negotiations to 
give one person an advantage over another, particularly an unfair 
advantage. The Treasurer can not, and will not, force the receivers to sell 
to Mr Palmer. " 163
A 1
161(1991) 75 NTR 1 
162(1991) 22 ALD 228 
163No QG 204 of 1995 ,20
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In Yates Security Services Ptv Ltd v Keating Lockhart J said:
"In my opinion, the ability to negotiate for the acquisition and development 
of the site, even if it is a commercial benefit, is one which Yates has 
whether it wins the case or not. Like any other member of the public it may 
negotiate for the acquisition and development o f the site. " 164
Leisure & Entertainment Pty Ltd could not fulfil the requirements o f Gibbs J's test as they
were in effect only winning a contest and not gaining an advantage.
There are two issues that need to be examined because o f the adoption of the
special interest test. The first is the concept of non-material concerns and interests. This
sets the limits for those who can seek standing under the special interest test. The second
issue is participation in the initial or primary decision-making process.
(a) Non-material concerns and interests: Emotional and intellectual interests do not
give an applicant standing. 165 However, Stephen J in Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd166
shows the difficulty of distinguishing between these concerns and interests. 167 Stephen J
regarded the special interest as consisting in the "intimate relationship", the "closeness" or
the "proximity" of the applicants to the subject-matter o f the action. His Honour said 'that
what is a special interest involves "in each case a curial assessment of the importance of
the concern which a plaintiff had with particular subject matter and of the closeness of that
plaintiffs relationship to that subject matter" . 168 Curial assessments o f the "intimate
relationship" of the applicants to the subject matter of an action have resulted in standing
164N o QG 204 of 1995 ,26
165Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary. Dept of Human Services and Health (1995) 128 ALR 
238 restated this rule clearly. See Lockhart J at 251-253 and Beaumont J at 266-267 
166( 1981) 149 CLR 289, 299-300
167North Coast Environment Council Inc v Minister for Resources (1994) 127 ALR 617, 630 where 
Sackville J notes that Stephen J was not convinced that an emotional concern could be a disqualification 
to standing. In Onus v Alcoa of Australia those who brought the action were able to show that by local 
Aboriginal law and custom that they were the custodians of the relics, and that these relics were of 
cultural and spiritual significance to the local Aboriginal community. For an alternative result see 
Everyone v State of Tasmania [1983] 49 ALR 381
168( 1981) 149 CLR 27, 42. This point was reinforced by Sackville J in North Coast Environment Council 
Inc v Minister for Resources (1994) 127 ALR 617, 630
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being granted to some community based organisations, but not others. 169 Gummow J 
stressed that when an applicant is attempting to enforce a public right, the applicant must 
show that the purposes and the ends advanced by the Parliament in enacting the statute are 
the same as those being advanced by the applicant in the process o f judicial review . 170
(b) Participation in initial or primary decision-making process: In Sinclair v Mining 
Warden at Maryborough it was held that where a plaintiff makes submissions under the 
administrative procedures adopted for the purpose o f making the decision, the plaintiff has 
standing by way o f a special interest to see that the procedures are complied with. 171 The 
rejection o f the ACF's argument172 that it had standing because it had presented an 
objection to the Minister raises the question whether this is a real basis for standing for 
declaration and injunction. Gibbs J distinguished Sinclair v Mining Warden at
169In Australian Conservation Foundation v Minister for Resources (1989) 19 ALD 70 Davies J found the 
ACF had standing to prosecute an action against the Minister for Resources in relation to the wood 
chipping licences issued in respect of the South East forest area. Davies J found that the evidence showed 
increased public concern for the environment, the ACF's high profile as the national conservation 
organisation and that it was both funded and consulted by both the State and Federal Governments. These 
factors alone didn't give standing, however when they were coupled with the ACF's long running interest 
in the South East forests standing was granted. Davies J noted that when determining standing it is 
necessary to take into account current community perceptions and values. Australian Conservation 
Foundation v Minister for Resources (1989) 19 ALD 70, 74 accepted and followed with approval in North 
Coast Environment Council Inc v Minister for Resources (1994) 127 ALR 617, 636. Sackville J in North 
Coast Environment Council Inc v Minister for Resources (1994) 127 ALR 617 adopted Davies J reasoning 
(1994) 127 ALR 617, 636. Here however the environmental organisation was much smaller, had a smaller 
resources and budget and no full time staff. However the North Coast Environment Organisation was the 
peak organisation in the area, had Commonwealth and State Government recognition as a "significant 
and responsible organisation', had conducted conferences and projects of concern in relation to the forests 
and had been consulted the government in relation to the issuing of saw milling licences in the area. Ogle 
v Strickland (1987) 71 ALR 41 provides an example, away from the environment organisations, where 
standing was granted to a plaintiff who had what may be termed an emotional concern in the subject- 
matter of the action. Here two Christian priests challenged the Censorship Board's decision to import a 
film into Australia. The two priests alleged that the film was blasphemous. The priests were given 
standing because they were of a group of committed Christians susceptible to offence and outrage which 
was not shared by non-believers. (1987) 71 ALR 41, 59 per Wilcox J They were also professionals who 
were priests and teachers and stood apart from the rest of the community because of their interest to stop 
the publication and dissemination of a blasphemous work. (1987) 71 ALR 41, 43 per Fisher J and 52-53 
per Lockhart J These three case illustrate the necessity for an 'intimate relationship with the subject-matter 
of the action'.
170 Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary, Dept of Human Services and Health (1995) 128 ALR 
238, 270
171(1975) 132 CLR 473 and The Laws of Australia: Administrative Law - Vol 2 Standing para 35 
172 Australian Conservation Foundation v The Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493
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Maryborough saying that Sinclair had a right to his action because he had appeared before 
the Mining Warden. In the ACF case, the ACF had lodged an objection and then awaited a 
reply. 173 There was no appearance before the Minister. The standing of the ACF was 
rejected because the procedure used to review the comments of the ACF was of no 
consequence or concern to the ACF. 174
In Alphapharm Ptv Ltd v Smithklein Beecham175. the court found that a 
competitor who had no right to be heard but had made submissions does not acquire 
standing. 176
In Australia Sinclair v Mining Warden at Maryborough is still the leading case for 
standing where mandamus is sought. The remedy of mandamus is used to force a public 
office holder to perform his duty according to law. It is not clear that this would give a 
person standing who tried to enforce a duty for the general public good. Sinclair, it was 
found, had a right to have the hearing conducted according to law . 177 However, Sinclair's 
interest was purely ideological and standing was given. Perhaps in this instance the right to 
object given by statute may be seen as a legal right that could be enforced. A person has 
standing if a duty is owed and the performance of the duty is for that persons benefit. 178 
For those who do not have a direct interest in the performance of the duty they may have
173(1980) 146 CLR 493, 531 for a contrary view see Murphy J at 557
174(1980) 146 CLR 493, 557; however note that Murphy J held that a plaintiff has a right to be heard 
because he or she has gone to the trouble to make comments.
175( 1994) 49 FCR250
176(1994) 49 FCR 250,269 per Burchett J. In Coles Mver Ltd v O'Brien (1992) 28 NSWLR 525 the Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales gave standing to an objector who had been refused leave 
to appear before a Licensing Court hearing. The objector had been late in raising it's objections yet had 
sufficient economic interests to sustain standing.
177R v Bowman [1898] 1 QB 663 was the authority used by Barwick CJ to give standing to Sinclair. 
Bowman's case does not show whether the licensing legislation had a definition of standing for an 
objector. It assumed that anybody who gave notice would be heard (see also R v Brisbane City Council 
[1986] 2 Q d R 2 2 ,  40).
178R v Toohev; ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170
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Standing if they can demonstrate a personal interest or a legal right to enforcement . 179 
Grievances must be real and substantial but they need not be financial. 180
The Special Interest Test and the FAT Act: The stranger181 trying to establish 
standing so as to obtain relief from a decision of the Treasurer will find that standing will 
not be easy to establish. The facts surrounding the action of the applicant are going to be 
critical. The list o f possible strangers is unlimited, however, the following is a review of 
some of the more likely groups to seek standing.
It must be remembered that when one is examining a person's claim to standing 
one is not examining the merits o f the person's action. That will be examined at a later 
time.
(1) Australian companies or persons attempting to acquire an Australian business 
or corporation in competition with a foreign person or corporation: Australian companies 
are not required to comply with the provisions of the FAT Act. An Australian company or 
business which is a competitor of a foreign company will not be given standing. Such a 
company and business is constrained by the argument that it is a competitor attempting to 
seek a commercial advantage by a using public law remedy. The FAT Act should not be 
seen as an Act, which creates a public right by which Australian companies or citizens can 
use the Government or the Courts to stop foreign investment in Australia. Australian 
companies face the problem that the ends that they are trying to advance through a judicial 
review action are not the same ends that the Parliament intended to advance when 
enacting the FAT Act.
179Re Exbea Ptv Ltd; ex parte M & Holdings Ptv Ltd (1989) 89 ATC 195
180Lord Denning attempted to liberalise the test for mandamus to give standing to everyone accept the 
mere busybody R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis: ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118 
181 Stranger means a person or a community group or corporation not directly involved in the decision 
made by the Treasurer. Those who are directly involved are the applicant and the corporation the subject 
of the acquisition.
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(2) Large or small community based groups. Community groups have been 
successful in obtaining standing injudicial review actions.182 However, such groups will 
find it difficult to obtain standing when challenging the FAT Act, as they usually have only 
an emotional or intellectual interest in the action. These types of groups also face the 
problem of reconciling the purpose of their judicial review action with the purpose and 
scope o f the Act against which they bring their action. These community based groups 
would be in direct conflict with stated government policy which promotes foreign 
investment. An argument based on community expectations put forward by Davies J 
would not promote the case o f community based groups, as there are no nationally 
recognised groups which campaign for the review of foreign investment. Environmental 
groups, for instance, would not obtain standing in an action against the FAT Act and 
would be more successful in stopping certain developments by using the more specific 
environmental and development legislation. There is no blanket right to standing for 
environmental organisations simply because the organisation's primary concern is the 
environment.183
Standing is not available to a group of businesses who have joined together to 
contest the arrival a large foreign company in their area.184 Such a group could not prove 
that it would suffer a loss greater than any other member of the community. In addition 
the loss would be prospective and not immediate. Standing for larger organisations would 
be enhanced if the organisation is one that is consulted regularly by government and is 
seen in the eyes of the community to represent reason in the action that it is trying to 
promote.
182Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v South Australia (1990) 53 SASR 349 (FC): Fraser Island 
Defenders Organisation v Hervev Bay Town Council [1983] 2 Qd R 72
183 Australian Conservation Foundation v Minister for Resources (1989) 19 ALD 70 and affirmed in Right 
to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary. Dept of Human Services and Health (1995) 128 ALR 238 
184Yates Security Ptv Ltd v Keating (1991) 22 ALD 228
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The protection of a local historical site from development or the take over by a 
foreign company of a business owned by a community group that controls and operates a 
local historical site is an example of where standing might be given to a community group.
(3) Employee Groups: Although unions have a statutory role in industrial matters, 
that alone does not give them standing in judicial review actions. This may be the case 
even if individual union members would have standing. Where a takeover is going to result 
in the laying off of union members or a substantial alteration to the conditions of 
employment of union members, a union is likely to be able to obtain standing in FAT Act 
actions, as this would be part of the legitimate role of the union to promote the interest of 
workers.185 However, unemployment must be a direct consequence of the takeover. A 
presumption that unemployment is only a possible outcome of the takeover is unlikely to 
give the union a basis for standing.
(4) Financial Stakeholders: This heading includes shareholders and creditors of the 
company which is the subject of the takeover. These people are certain to have standing as 
they are able to show a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the action.
185 Administrative & Clerical Officers Assoc v Conn (1988) 52 NTR 57
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Chapter 6
Judicial Review - Justiciability:
"The real issue ...is not the ability of judicial tribunals to make a decision on the 
questions presented, but the appropriateness of the use of judicial techniques for such 
purposes."186
The Administrative Review Council (the ARC) in its R eport187 acknowledges that 
justiciability would be the predominant consideration used by the Federal Courts to justify 
their refusal to review a decision made pursuant to the FAT Act. Where there is an 
exercise of an executive power or a statutory power involving a Cabinet level decision or a 
matter of great political sensitivity, justiciability will be a limitation on review.188 The ARC 
went on to recommend that decisions made pursuant to the FAT Act should be reviewable 
under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act (the AD(JR) Act).189 At the 
moment this is not the case. Section 39B of the Judiciary Act is the only avenue available 
for judicial review.190
Why does the ARC believe that justiciability will be the defining factor when the 
Federal Court is asked to review decisions which have been made in accordance with the 
FAT Act? The national interest test has been perceived as a test that only the executive 
government can answer.191 The variety of issues that may be taken into account when 
determining what is or is not in the national interest are legion. The ARC believes that the
186 Operation Dismantle v R (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 481, 500 per Wilson J
187Administrative Review Council Report No 32: Review of the Administrative Decisions ( Judicial 
Review ) Act: The Ambit of the Act. AGPS 1989 ( the "ARC Report No 32").
188ARC Report No32 p64.
189ARC Report No32 p64. see also discussion in Chapter 4.
190ARC Report No32 p63
191For a non-lawyers point of view see "The Powers of The Senate": The Financial Review Wednesday 
February 16, 1994 p i3; "The Ultimate Decision": The Weekend Australian February 12 - 13, 1994 p21. 
The Senate Print Media Inquiry p88 para 3.173, pl94 para 8.5, p214 para 9.9
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issues raised by the national interest test are of a political nature. Therefore the test can 
and should only be determined by the executive government. There is concern that the 
test, being polycentric in nature, is not suitable for the judicial process to decide. The ARC 
is concerned that the Courts may involve themselves in specifying which foreign 
investment proposals are appropriate. The ARC recommendation that the FAT Act be 
subject to the provisions o f the AD(JR) Act is motivated by the provisions dealing with 
divestiture192 and the rearrangement of corporate documents. 193
Foreign investment applications are treated on a case by case basis. As policy is 
comprehensive and broad, each application must be designed to comply with the broad 
requirements. The administration of foreign investment policy has led to the adoption of 
different policy considerations for different sectors of the economy. 194 Applications for the 
purchase of residential real estate have caused policy take on the form of rules.
Compliance with policy generally results in approval for purchase. This contrasts with 
applications for acquisition in other sectors of the economy where the application of policy 
is more fluid. These applications are subject to a more detailed consideration by the 
Treasurer than are the urban real estate applications. Non urban real estate applications, 
depending on their size, are approved by either the Treasurer or the Assistant Treasurer. 195
Justiciability has been described as an "inherently slippery subject" 196and judicial 
attempts to define justiciability have been imprecise. A justiciable dispute is one which is 
proper and apt for submission to the judicial process. 197 Another definition is "a dispute 
that may appropriately be resolved by the Courts" . 198 Justiciability, as a concept in its
192FAT Act sl8(4) divestiture of shares; sl9(4) divestiture of assets; s21(3) divestiture of businesses 
193FAT Act s20(3)
194Australia's Foreign Investment Policy, AGPS, Canberra, September 1992 Ch 2 pp 6 - 12 
195See discussion in footnote 143
196Allars; Introduction to Australian Administrative Law: Butterworths 1990 para[1.85] p43 
197Marshall; Justiciability: Ch X Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: 1961 at page 265 
198Allars; Introduction to Australian Administrative Law: Butterworths 1990 para[1.86] p42
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simplest form, is the search for the most appropriate forum in which to resolve disputes.
As Melville Wilson199 points out:
"The word justiciable .... is legitimately capable o f denoting almost any 
question. That is to say, the questions are few which are intrinsically 
incapable o f submission to a tribunal having an established procedure, with 
an orderly presentation of such evidence as is available, for the purpose of 
an adjudication from which practical consequences in human conduct are 
to follow ." 200
The question the Court asks is: "Are the Courts the appropriate forum to review 
FAT Act decisions or is there another forum more appropriate as a review body who 
should review the decision?" There being no appeal from the Treasurer's decision, the only 
external review available is judicial review. This review tests the legality of the decision 
making process; it is not a review of the merits of the decision.201 Therefore, a person 
seeking to review the Treasurer's decision is questioning the decision-making process; the 
person will not receive a review of the merits of the Treasurer's decision. This does not 
mean that the motive behind seeking a review of the decision is to obtain a review of the 
merits of the application.
The problem for most litigants in dealing with the FAT Act is the wide variety of 
issues that are taken into account when determining whether an application should 
proceed. The FAT Act deals predominantly as a vehicle for the review of the amount of 
foreign investment in Australia. The Treasurer in permitting investment is making a 
calculated decision that the particular investment will help increase living standards by 
providing future benefits to the Australian economy. The Treasurer also hopes that the 
particular investment will not increase unemployment, result in cultural imperialism or 
reduce living standards of Australian citizens. Questions of employment, profit, market 
share, trade practices, the control by foreigners o f Australian assets and industry, the 
export of Australian capital, the increase or decrease of Australian living standards may all
1 " 'Political Questions' (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296
200'Political Questions' (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296 at 299
20’Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1983) 154 CLR 25, 70 per Brennan J
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be relevant issues when reviewing an application. It is the polycentric nature of the 
decision which makes it difficult for resolution before a Court. Wilson J in Operation 
Dismantle v The Queen202 cautions that Courts should not absolve themselves from 
hearing a matter because of the perceived problems with evidence, proof and judicial 
competence when dealing with matters that contain moral and political considerations.
"[I]n response to that contention it can be pointed out that, [the Courts] are called upon 
all the time to decide questions o f principle and policy." 203
Not all disputes between individuals or groups of individuals or individuals and 
government are appropriate for solution by Courts. When issues are termed 'justiciable' or 
'non-justiciable' by parties to a dispute, the term is frequently being used to justify the 
resolution o f the dispute before the forum in which the disputants perceive that their own 
best interest will be best served. The appropriate fonum may be a Court, or it may be an 
administrative tribunal or the Cabinet or a departmental officer. However, the term 
'justiciable' is most often used in reference to the resolution of a dispute before a Court or 
quasi-judicial tribunal. The Court is often accepted as an appropriate tribunal as it is 
perceived as being independent from the executive government, it acts without bias and 
has defined procedures for gathering and analysing evidence. The decisions of the Court 
are also final and authoritative and able to be enforced. However, whether it is appropriate 
to apply judicial techniques to resolving disputes is the critical question. The rules of 
evidence and the presentation of evidence to a Court within the adversary system may not 
result in the best decision. Litigants do not have to present all the evidence in relation to 
the matter before the Court, they only have to present the evidence which promotes the 
respective case of each party. Evidence may be withheld because public interest immunity 
attaches to it or the documents are of a highly sensitive commercial nature.
202(1985) 18 DCR (4th) 481
203Operation Dismantle v The Queen (1985) 18 DCR (4th) 481, 499 per Wilson J
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Through the case law the Courts have attempted to resolve which disputes are 
justiciable and non-justiciable. It has been found necessary to place limits on the disputes 
which are to be reviewed by the Courts, that is which disputes are determined to be 
justiciable.204 First, the Courts will examine the source and subject matter o f the power o f 
the administrator. The Courts have to examine the subject matter o f the dispute, to see if it 
has already been decided by the Courts, that this type o f decision will not be reviewed.
The subjects that are considered non-justiciable are drawn mainly from the prerogative 
powers.205 Second, the Courts will examine the status or nature o f the decision-maker 
exercising the power.206 The Courts have identified certain decision making bodies whose 
decisions require the Courts to consider carefully whether they will review these decisions.
204For a discussion of the appropriateness of the Courts expertise and competence see Marshall; 
Justiciability: Ch X Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: 1961; Lon L. Fuller: The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication (1978) 92 Harv LR 353; Robert S. Summers: Justiciability (1963) 26 MLR 530 
205Non-iusticiable subjects: The subjects that are considered non-justiciable are drawn mainly from the 
prerogative powers.(see Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374) 
These include the power to make treaties, matters dealing with the defence of the realm, Australia's 
relationship with other countries, national security, the prerogative of mercy, granting of honours, the 
dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of Ministers Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for 
the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, adopted in Australia in Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1983) 
154 CLR 25. The Courts consider these prerogative powers. Australia's entry into or breach of an 
international obligation is not justiciable at the suit of a private citizen. (Koowarta v Bielke-Petersen 
(1982) 153 CLR 168). Agreements between Australia and foreign governments are not justiciable 
(Gerhardv v Brown (1985)159 CLR 70). The Courts are expressing the view that this is an issue solely for 
the executive government alone. In Coutts v Commonwealth (1984) 157 CLR 91 where an army officer 
was unable to claim against the Commonwealth for negligence. The prerogative power of defence of the 
realm was considered non-justiciable by the High Court. National security is a subject which the English 
Courts are not prepared to examine. The production to the Courts of the Prime Ministers certificate that it 
is not in the interests of national security that unions should be able to recruit members in the national 
intelligence gathering centre was held to be conclusive evidence of non-justiciability (Council of Civil 
Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374). Although in Church of Scientology v 
Woodward (1983) 154 CLR 25 the High Court agreed in that instance with the views of the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) as to the security interests of Australia, the Court was clear that 
particular acts of ASIO were justiciable upon an allegation of bad faith or whether ASIO's acts were 
relevant to security and therefore intra vires. There is a problem with determining justiciability by 
reference to subject matter. A complete decision can be made up of many individual steps. Many of these 
steps in the decision-making process are able to be challenged and are justiciable. The final decision, 
however, may in fact be of a subject which is non-justiciable. Yet the Courts in reviewing the preceding 
steps may have inadvertently strayed into an area that is strictly not for them to review. For further 
reading see Allars, An Introduction to Australian Administrative Law, 1990 at p55.
206O'Shea v South Australia (1987) 73 ALR 1 and The Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v 
Peko Wallsend Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 218
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These include Ministers207, Executive Council208, the Governor-General209 and Cabinet210. 
There are a variety of reasons why these bodies have been singled out. However, the main 
reason is that they are at the apex of the government pyramid.
Judicial Review - Justiciability in Relation to The FAT Act
Is the national interest test justiciable? The answer appears simple: the decision of 
the Treasurer is based on a statutory discretion and is therefore reviewable. As Melville 
Wilson affirms, any tribunal can make a decision on any question before it. The 
problematic question is the appropriateness of settling a dispute using judicial techniques 
where the defining criterion is the national interest. Should the question of a matter being 
"contrary to the national interest" be answered by the Treasurer alone. Five questions 
should be considered in determining whether matter concerning the national interest is 
justiciable.211 These questions are not relevant to the merits of the judicial review action; 
they relate only to justiciability.
1. Who is the decision-maker?212 The decision-maker nominated by the FAT Act is 
the Treasurer 213 However, as the FAT Act is administered, the Treasurer is not alone in 
making the decision. Depending on the size and nature o f the transaction the Assistant
207Murpyores Inc Ptv Ltd v The Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 
208FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 41 ALR 1 
2Q9R v Toohev; ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170 
210O'Shea v South Australia (1987) 73 ALR 1
211 These questions are the same questions that were asked in O'Shea v South Australia (1987) 73 ALR 1 
and The Minister for Arts. Heritage and Environment v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 218. Although 
the Courts did not structure their judgements using these questions, these are the points upon which the 
judgements are based.
212 All the judges examine this point closely O'Shea v South Australia (1987) 73 ALR 1,6 per Mason CJ, 
18 per Wilson and Toohey JJ, 24 per Brennan J; The Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko 
Wallsend Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 218, 224 per Bowen CJ, 226 per Sheppard J, 251 per Wilcox J. A clear 
identification is imperative.
213FAT Act sl8(2), s i 9(2), s20(2), s21(2) and s21 A(2)
co
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Treasurer or the Executive Officer of the FIRB may make decisions. Some of the 
applications for acquisition may even require the matter be referred to Cabinet.214
2. Is the decision-maker influenced by political judgement?215 The proximity of the 
decision-maker to the core of politics will influence the deliberations of the Court in 
determining whether the decision is justiciable or not. The Courts are prepared to review 
decisions made in proximity to the political core. However, extreme caution in the review 
of Cabinet decisions can be discerned from the cases, because Cabinet decisions are 
quintessential^ political decisions, and all ministerial decisions are reviewable.216 It is 
appropriate to examine two cases where the Courts reviewed decisions made by those 
closest to the political core.
In O'Shea v South Australia217 (O'Shea's Case) different views were offered on the 
question whether Cabinet decisions could be reviewed. Mason CJ took the view that 
Cabinet decisions were susceptible to judicial review when Cabinet was the decision­
maker. His Honour recognised that Cabinet was a body primarily concerned with "the 
political, economic and social concerns o f the moment" and not normally subject to 
review. But the effect of a Cabinet decision determine whether the dispute is justiciable.218 
Brennan, Wilson and Toohey JJ saw that the decision was one for Executive Council and 
therefore was a decision of Cabinet.219 Their Honours noted that Cabinet was involved,
214It is not clear which proposals are referred to Cabinet. However those decisions which are in politically 
sensitive are no doubt so referred. The Fairfax takeover is an example.
215The identification of the decision-maker's proximity to the political core has been used by the courts as 
a caution as to whether a decision is reviewable.
216Murphvores Inc. Ptv. Ltd, v The Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1 
217(1987) 73 ALR 1
218M.C. Harris in his article "The Courts and The Cabinet: Unfastening the Buckle." 1989 PL 251, 263 
makes the point that Mason C J's judgement reflects "the current judicial impatience with status based 
immunities based on a constitutional facade".
219In South Australia the constitutional practice meant that all Executive Council decisions were Cabinet 
decisions: see (1987) 73 ALR 1, 6 per Mason J
C A
55
and therefore, the decision was made in the political process and political considerations 
applied.220
Sheppard J in the Minister for Arts. Heritage and Environment v Peko Wallsend 
Ltd221 (Peko's Case) adopted Mason CJ's view that, if Cabinet is given the power to make 
decisions by statute, then Cabinet decisions are reviewable. However for reasons of public 
policy, which Sheppard J outlined as the essential nature of the organisation, the fact that 
Cabinet has no legal status and the sanctions which bind Cabinet are political, Cabinet 
decisions should only be reviewed with caution.222 After reviewing the case law, Wilcox J 
found that Executive Council decisions were open to review upon all the usual grounds of 
judicial review .223 Counsel for Peko Wallsend tried to equate the position of Executive 
Council with Cabinet. Counsel argued that the reasons put forward to support Cabinet's 
immunity from review, viz 'the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, the fact that decisions 
often involve policy elements and the general need for confidentiality' - are the same 
reasons which have been held to be insufficient to exclude any review of Executive 
Council. Wilcox J concludes: "T think that there is substance in this." 224
The Executive Officer of the FIRB is able to make decisions in relation to 
applications for the purchase of residential real estate. The Executive Officer is a senior 
bureaucrat and, therefore, an unelected official. The Executive Officer is removed from the 
core of political decision-making. The Executive Officer is not a politician and decisions 
made by the Executive Officer should be treated as if they were made under an ordinary 
statutory discretion.
The Treasurer examines the remaining transactions. These include transactions 
which are complex or of a potentially explosive political nature. Some of these more
220(1987) 73 ALR 1,18,  24. Deane J took a contra view saying that where a decision is one that affects an 
individual politics is not an issue ((1987) 73 ALR 1, 30)
221 ( 1987)75 ALR 218 
222( 1987)75 ALR 218, 227 
223 Ibid p247 
224Ibid p247
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complex transactions are referred to Cabinet for review. The involvement of Cabinet in the 
process will make some judges wary of reviewing the decision. The involvement of 
Cabinet in the decision-making process may raise the prospect that those decisions in 
which Cabinet is involved are not to be susceptible to judicial review. However, when 
Cabinet is not involved in the decision-making process, the Treasurer's decision becomes 
susceptible to judicial review. This form of demarcation between those decisions which are 
justiciable and those which are not seem to be arbitrary.225
3. What is the subject matter of the decision? One must examine the subject-matter 
of the decision to determine whether it fits within one o f the accepted categories of a non- 
justiciable matter.226 Decisions under the FAT Act involve economic and social matters. 
There appears to be no evidence of any application whose matter falls into one of the 
categories which have been deemed to be non-justiciable. However, counsel for the 
Treasurer in Leisure & Entertainment Ptv Ltd v Willis227made a submission that any 
decision by the Treasurer or the Courts to overturn the contract involved in this case 
would damage the international commercial reputation of Australia. This submission 
implied that there were matters in the decisions made by the Treasurer which would affect 
the external relations of Australia with other countries and, therefore, the whole matter 
was non-justiciable. Spender J noted this submission in his judgement, although he did not 
comment on it directly: decisions made by the Treasurer certainly could affect the 
international commercial reputation of Australia; however, this reputation is not part of 
the relationship of Australia with other countries as referred to in the categories of non- 
justiciable matter.
225See Peter Bayne: Justiciability: The Report of the Administrative Review Council (1989) 63 ALJ 767 
and Natural Justice. Public Policy and Justiciability (1988) 62 ALJ 225 on the possible implications of 
Cabinet being brought into the decision-making process.
226see footnote 205 
227No QG 204 of 1995, 20
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4. Is the decision of the Treasurer one of'general policy' or a decision of an 
'individual nature'228? The O'Shea Case and the Peko Case are examples of the two types 
o f decision being discussed. The decision being reviewed in Peko's Case was a 'general 
policy' decision. Although Peko Wallsend was going to have its exploration rights severely 
curtailed the Court found that Cabinet's decision was of a general policy nature. There 
were, as Bowen CJ described it;
"complex policy questions relating to the environment, the rights of 
Aboriginals, mining and the impact on Australia's economic position of 
allowing or not allowing mining as well as matters affecting private 
interests such as those of [Peko Wallsend].... Decisions have to be taken in 
the public interest, notwithstanding that the lives, interests and rights of 
some individual citizens may be adversely affected by the decision."229
These general policy decisions are of a political nature.
A similar sentiment was expressed by Lord Radcliffe in Chandler v Director of 
Public Prosecutions:230
"The more one looks at it, the plainer it becomes, I think, that the question 
whether it is in the true interests of this country to acquire, retain or house 
nuclear armaments depends on an infinity o f considerations, military and 
diplomatic, technical, psychological and moral, and of decisions, tentative 
or final, which are themselves part assessments of fact and part 
expectations and hopes. 1 do not think there is anything amiss with a legal 
ruling that does not make this a matter for a judge or jury."
The Courts are not to see themselves as substitute decision-makers.
The Courts in Peko's Case and in O'Shea's Case231 found that where a matter of 
general policy is involved there would be no review of the decision. Phrases such as 'public 
interest', 'ministerial policy giving effect to the public interest', 'public opinion' and 'public 
policy reasons' are used to identify the Cabinet decision as one of a general nature and,
228This is the distinction that was adopted in both O'Shea v South Australia (1987) 73 ALR 1 and The 
Minister for Arts. Heritage and Environment v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 218 
229(1987) 75 ALR 218, 225 per Bowen CJ 
230[1962] 3 All ER 142, 151
231 O'Shea v South Australia (1987) 73 ALR 1 the majority on this issue were Brennan , Wilson and 
Toohey JJ. Mason CJ and Deane J were in agreement.
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therefore, applicable to all. Brennan J held that where general policy is concerned, and in this
instance it is called the "public interest", then this is a matter of political responsibility:
"When we reach the area of ministerial policy giving effect to the public 
interest, we enter the political field. In that field a Minister or a Cabinet may 
determine general policy or the interests o f the general public free from 
procedural constraints; he is or they are confined only by the limits otherwise 
expressed by statute ." 232
Some of the judges seemed to imply that when the public interest is involved the
Courts are unable to review the decision.233 The forum in which one challenges these
decisions should, therefore, be a political forum. Wilson and Toohey JJ argued that the
Courts have no role in the review of these types o f decisions. M.C. Harris argues that
there is an implication in the joint judgement of Wilson and Toohey JJ that all decisions of
Cabinet are non-justiciable.234 Although the decisions in Peko's Case and in O'Shea's Case
under challenge were decisions o f Cabinet, members of both Courts implied that similar
considerations would apply to a ministerial decision giving effect to the public interest.235
However, caution must be exercised before proceeding further in this discussion. Brennan
J in Church of Scientology v Woodward236 spoke of the ability o f the Courts to review
subjects of national security in the following way .
"The court is not bound by the Organization's opinion as to what 
constitutes security or what is relevant to it. As Lord Devlin said in 
Chandler v Director o f Public Prosecutions: 'There is no rule of common 
law that whenever questions o f national security are being considered by 
any court for any purposes, it is what the Crown thinks to be necessary or
expedient that counts, and not what is necessary or expedient in fact.... It is
sufficient to say that the difficulties inherent in questions of national 
security do not affect the justiciability of the issues, though they are of
232(1987) 73 ALR 1,25
233Q'Shea v South Australia (1987) 73 ALR 1,17 per Wilson and Toohey JJ joint judgement. Here their 
Honours adopt the words of Lord Scarman in Re Findley [1985] AC 318, 332-3 "But neither the Board 
nor the judiciary can be as close, or as sensitive, to public opinion as a Minister responsible to Parliament 
and the electorate. He has to judge the public acceptability of early release and to determine the policies 
needed to maintain public confidence in the system of criminal justice." Their Honours also distinguished 
FA1 Insurances Ltd v Winneke at (1987) 73 ALR 1, 20 saying "There was little, if  any, room for the
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major importance in determining the sufficiency of evidence bearing on 
those issues"
Therefore, the interests of a government do not always agree with the national interest. 
Peko's Case and Chandler v Director o f Public Prosecutions indicate that, where there are 
polycentric decisions o f a type similar to those decisions made under the FAT Act, the 
Courts will be inclined not to grant judicial review. However, Brennan's caution from 
Church of Scientology v Woodward would suggest that difficult questions, such as those 
which involve national security, are still justiciable. These difficult questions affect the 
sufficiency of evidence and not justiciability.
Decisions which are of an individual nature, on the other hand, must refer to the 
individual solely or be such that the decision could only refer to a small group of 
individuals, where the individual may face imprisonment or loss of financial freedom .237 
O'Shea's Case dealt with Mr O'Shea's application for freedom from imprisonment. The 
decision of Cabinet in this matter was considered not to be of an individual nature and 
therefore did not qualify for review, despite the strong dissent of Deane J .238 The decision 
o f the Court seems extraordinary as the matter for decision could not be patently more 
individually based. However the decision must be seen in the light of the particular 
statutory provisions which guide the South Australian parole system. This does not detract 
from the proposition that a decision by Cabinet relating to an individual is reviewable.
The test adopted by Wilcox J in the Peko Case is the more likely test to be adopted 
in matters where the issues are relevant to an individual. This test was first expounded by 
Lord Diplock in Council o f Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service.239 The
237Q'Shea v South Australia (1987) 73 ALR 1 only referred to personal liberty. However if the Cabinet 
were to deliberately take away a person's financial liberty, and the decision was directed at that person, 
and not as part of a wider community action, then a similar argument could be made.
238( 1987) 73 ALR 1,26
239Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374 Lord Diplock's test 
is:
"To qualify as a subject for judicial review the decision must have consequences which affect some person 
(or body of persons) other than the decision-maker, although it may affect him too. It must affect such 
other person either:(a) by altering rights or obligations of that person which are enforceable by or against 
him in private law; or(b) by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past
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test requires that an individual must have a right, obligation or legitimate expectation that 
is affected by the decision. The core of the test, however, is that the decision under review 
has a direct and immediate consequence, and not some likelihood of a consequence or 
effect at some time in the future. Therefore, there must be a direct and immediate effect on 
the rights, obligations and legitimate expectations of the person seeking review. In the 
Peko Case. Wilcox J noted that, even if this test were satisfied, a decision may not be 
justiciable because it might come within one of the categories which was regarded as being 
non-justiciable.
The legitimate expectation of the applicant to invest is that his application will be 
dealt with according to stated policy. The question becomes more complex where the 
applicant for judicial review is not the applicant investing, that is a stranger to the 
application. A stranger must show that a right, obligation or legitimate expectation o f his 
will be affected by the Treasurer's decision. The stranger must then show that as the direct 
and immediate consequence of the Treasurer's decision, his asserted right, obligation or 
legitimate expectation will be affected. Wilcox J outlines the types of decisions that 
Cabinet makes everyday which disadvantage people.240 Included in this list are decisions to 
spend or not to spend public monies on social programmes, and decisions to construct or 
not to construct buildings or roads. These may have grave consequences upon a person 
but the decision is not justiciable.
"Government, at all levels, would become unworkable if there were an 
obligation, before making any decision which may be financially 
disadvantageous to an individual, to seek out and to hear all the affected 
persons."241
Wilcox J highlights the effect that the decision of Cabinet had on Peko-EZ as:
been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to 
continue to do until there has been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on 
which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision­
maker will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending 
that they should not be withdrawn..."
240(1987) 75 ALR 218, 251 
241 (1987) 75 ALR 218, 251
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'Peko-EZ was in much the same situation as the owner of a service station 
who finds its value diminished by a government decision to re-route a 
highway. The existing rights remain, but they have been made less 
valuable. "242
For strangers who object to the Treasurer's decision and who are competitors of the 
applicant to invest, there will be no immediate effect from the Treasurer's decision. The 
decision to allow an investment may in the long term reduce the profits of an Australian or 
even force an Australian out of business, but that must be left to the marketplace.
Which category includes the decisions of the Treasurer? Decisions relating to the 
purchase of urban land clearly come within the Wilcox test. Applications are judged by a 
defined set of rules and practices. The Treasurer's decision to disallow a purchase when all 
the policy requirements have been fulfilled would deny a legitimate expectation to 
purchase, especially where policy states that a proposal will be accepted if it complies with 
one of the accepted categories.243
The non-residential real estate transactions pose a difficulty. Is the decision of the 
Treasurer in relation to non-residential real estate of a general policy type or a decision 
which is directed at an individual? Decisions of the Treasurer have elements o f both types 
o f decisions. The decisions are polycentric, but they are directed to one applicant. The 
Courts decide whether the FAT Act will apply to each case on the facts. That the FAT Act 
is susceptible to judicial review is unquestionable. The Courts, however, may decide that, 
in relation to applications to invest, they are not qualified to review the decision making 
process. A decision in relation to divestiture is justiciable as it affects an individual and 
qualifies under the Wilcox test.
The national interest test, being undefined, means that the Treasurer must first 
define the policy o f what is contrary to the national interest before he can apply that policy 
to a decision. The policy must not be ultra vires the FAT Act. The policy has been kept
242(1987) 75 ALR 218, 252
243Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, AGPS, Canberra. September 1992 Ch 2 p 11
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deliberately fluid. The overriding philosophy that determines foreign investment policy is 
benefit to Australia. Therefore, few, if any, legitimate proposals are going to be rejected. 
Those proposals which are rejected are rejected for reasons that they simply do not 
conform with the stated policy. However, even where a decision does not conform with 
stated policy, there is great difficulty overturning the decision.244 The criterion for 
determining applications is cast in the negative, viz that the application must be contrary to 
the national interest. Therefore, the Treasurer must be satisfied that the national interest 
will not be detrimentally affected. It does not mean that the national interest is not going 
to be promoted.
The Treasurer and the bureaucrats involved in the FAT Act decision-making 
process are convinced that this area of decision-making is no place for judicial 
interference. The fact that there are few detailed pales and limited statutory requirements 
and forms to be complied with, and the practice of informal discussions to assist in the 
structuring of the application, suggest that the Act was designed to be applied in a fluid 
and relaxed manner. The decision making processes have not been judicialised.
However, the FAT Act imposes quite draconian penalties for non-compliance. The 
Treasurer can order the divestiture of shares and assets. He may institute criminal 
proceedings to enforce compliance. The proper application of these penalties can only be 
made through the Courts. Therefore, the Courts have a role in reviewing the decisions of 
the Treasurer.
5. Are the grounds for judicial review appropriate when applied to the Treasurer's 
decision? For a person wishing to challenge a decision o f the Treasurer, the decision is 
more likely to be justiciable than not. The Treasurer's decision may involve matters that 
relate to policy and are complex in nature. There is no doubt that the decisions of the 
Treasurer take heed of politically sensitive issues. However, the Courts are not averse to
244Leisure & Entertainment Ptv Ltd v Willis No QG 204 of 1995
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resolving disputes that involve questions of a poly centric nature. Examples include the 
complex commercial matters of trade practices or the complex social matters involved in 
the decisions of the Family Court. The Courts examine decisions for compliance with the 
law. However, when Parliament gives a discretion to a Minister, it is for the Minister to 
exercise the discretion. This point was made by Spender J in Leisure & Entertainment Ptv 
Ltd v Willis:
"[The] question [of what is contrary to the national interest] is, by 
legislation, consigned to the Treasurer and it is his opinion which is 
necessary as a precondition to the exercise of his discretion." 245
The delimiting factor, however, is that it is difficult to establish a rational test 
which can appropriately distinguish those decisions which are appropriate for review and 
those which are not. Each application for review of the Treasurer's discretion must be 
considered on its own facts. The discretion of the Treasurer is a statutory discretion and it 
is confined by the terms of the FAT Act. The evidence before the Court will allow the 
Court to examine each decision and use its own discretion to determine which applications 
should succeed and which should not.
/C-5
245No QG 204 of 1995, 31
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Chapter 7
Judicial Review: Grounds of Review
Review of statutory discretions
To keep decision-makers within the bounds of the legislative framework is the role 
of judicial review. The Courts have held that even the widest discretion has limits and 
these limits are to be found within the statute itself Stephen J in R v Toohev; ex parte 
Northern Land Council said:
"It will be seldom, if ever, that the extent of the power cannot be seen to 
exclude from consideration by a decision-maker all corrupt or entirely 
personal and whimsical considerations, considerations which are 
unconnected with proper governmental administration.246... [T]he task for 
the court will be to discern what restraints, if any, the legislation places 
upon considerations to which he may have regard.... Where a Parliament 
confers powers they will seldom, if ever be conferred in gross, devoid of 
purposes or criteria express or implied, by reference to which they are 
intended to be exercised. Unless a Parliament, acting constitutionally, can 
be seen from the terms of its grant of power to have excluded judicial 
review, the courts will, at the instance of a litigant, examine the exercise of 
powers so granted determining whether the exercise is within their scope of 
Parliament's grant of power. "247
The Courts are obligated to determine the limits of a Minister's discretion. The Courts 
look first to see if the legislation is within the legislative competence of the Parliament to 
enact. The Commonwealth Parliament is competent to enact the FAT Act legislation by
246 Stephen J is quoting from his earlier judgement in Murphyores Inc Ptv. Ltd, v The Commonwealth 
(1976) 136 CLR 1, 12
247Stephen J in_R v Toohev; ex parte Northern Land Council (1980-81) 151 CLR 170, 203, 204 Mason J 
in Murphyores Inc Ptv Ltd v The Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1, 23 made the following comments 
about the court's ability to determine the width of a statutory discretion:
" .... the subject matter and the scope and purpose of a statutory enactment may enable a court to 
pronounce the reasons given for the exercise of a statutory discretion to be extraneous to any objects the 
legislature had in mind ...." quoted with approval by Stephen J in R y  Toohev: ex parte Northern Land 
Council (1980-81) 151 CLR 170, 203.
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virtue of its trade and commerce and the external affairs powers.248 Second they examine 
the subject matter of the enactment and the terms of the particular discretion to establish 
the limits of the discretion. Third, the Courts examine the relevant decision to see that it is 
made within the terms of the discretion and the power has not been exercised "outside the 
purpose of the Act, or unfairly, or upon an incorrect basis of fact." 249
The second task for the Court {supra) is to examine the subject matter, scope and 
purpose of the enactment and the relevant discretion to establish the limits of the 
discretion. "Contrary to the national interest" is the only test under the FAT Act the 
Treasurer is required to apply when deciding whether an application to invest in Australia 
is acceptable or not. The test that the Treasurer must apply seems deceptively simple.
Does the test 'contrary to the national interest' have form or limits?
The short title of the FAT Act reads the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act. 
The long title reads "An Act relating to the foreign acquisition of certain land interests and 
to the foreign control of certain business enterprises and mineral rights." Pertinent matters 
are raised by these titles: first, there must be a foreigner or foreign interest involved in the 
proposed transaction and, second, the foreigner or foreign interest must be acquiring an 
interest in land or taking over or controlling a business or a mineral right in Australia. The 
FAT Act therefore has nothing to do with domestic takeovers.
The protection of the ownership of Australian land, protection and retention of the 
control of Australian businesses and retention of control and ownership of Australian 
natural resources make up the subject matter of the FAT Act. Control is the principal 
concept raised by the long and short titles. Control refers to the ability of the Treasurer to 
review the volume of foreign investment, as well as to control the ability of a foreign 
corporation to acquire an Australian corporation, business or resources. The FAT Act has 
been administered on the premise that foreign investment is of benefit to the community
248The Constutition s 51 pl(i) and (xxix)
249Lord Wilberforce Laker Airways v Department of Trade [1977] AC 1014, 1047
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through the increased availability of capital, employment opportunities, the introduction of 
new technology and management skills and the creation of new industries. The control 
exercised by the Treasurer means that this capital and new technology can be directed to 
areas determined by the government to be most in need. These areas are set out in the 
foreign investment policy.
The FAT Act attempts to view those transactions which are o f a reasonable size 
and will impact on the economy.250 The 1989 amendments to the FAT Act exempted 
many transactions from review on the basis that the monetary value of the transaction was 
too small. As has been stated, the FAT Act requires the notification o f takeovers by 
acquisition of shares. Acquisition or control by the other methods ie board representation, 
changes to the constituent documents of corporations, purchase of assets, profit sharing 
schemes are also reviewable,251 Takeovers in the broadcasting and banking sectors must 
comply with separate legislation.252 Therefore jurisdiction under the FAT Act is governed 
not only by the mechanics of the transaction, but also, by the monetary value of the 
transaction.
The FAT Act requires that all transactions for the purchase of Australian urban 
land be notified regardless of the size253. Certain exemptions from notification are 
permitted by regulation. These exemptions relate mainly to charities and investments by 
insurance companies where the main beneficiaries are Australian.254 There are also 
exemptions for certain schemes for the purchase of land under "off the plan
250The FAT Act set thresholds by a combination of sections see the section headed 'The FAT A ct: A 
Short Analysis'
251 Acquisitions or takeovers by acquisition of shares - sl8 & s26; Acquisition of assets - sl9; 
Arrangements relating to directorates of corporations - s20; Arrangements relating to the control of 
Australian business - s21; Acquisition of an interest in Australian urban land - s21A & s26A.
252In relation to broadcasting an applicant must comply with the Broadcasting Services Act 1992. In 
relation to banks an applicant must comply with the Banking Act 1959 and the Bank (Shareholdings) Act 
1972. Special policy also applies in the Aviation and Mining sectors: see Australia's Foreign Investment 
Policy, AGPS, Canberra, September 1992 p6 and 7 
253FAT Act s21A & s26A 
254See regulations 3(a) - (e)
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arrangements".255 New immigrants are also exempt from the provisions of the FAT Act 
when purchasing residential real estate.256
The FAT Act has a number of provisions to ensure compliance with its terms. 
Failure to comply with the compulsory reporting provisions in s26 and s26A can result in 
fines o f up to $ 10,000 or imprisonment in the case of individuals and $ 250,000 in the 
case o f a corporation. Anti-avoidance provisions, if proved, can result in the divestiture o f 
assets or rearrangement of the investment. The Treasurer may also order divestiture of 
other proposals which are subject to prohibition.
The purpose of the FAT Act is to give the Treasurer, as the chief economic officer 
of the Commonwealth, the power to control and to review the flow of capital into the 
country where this capital is used to acquire Australian companies, business, land or 
resources. The FAT Act also allows the Treasurer to review other forms of takeover 
where the injection of capital, into a business is not the primary instrument of the takeover 
but where the takeover is achieved through board appointments, profit sharing schemes, 
and the purchase o f the assets of a corporation or a business. Therefore, the Treasurer is 
able to review and control the volume of foreign investment, to direct this investment to 
areas where it would be most beneficial and to prohibit undesirable investments and 
acquisitions. The FAT Act was not designed to be used as a tool by Australian businesses 
in the market place to protect them from competition by foreign businesses and 
corporations. The FAT Act is designed to keep the Government informed about the flow 
of capital into Australia and the purposes for which the capital is being used.
The FAT Act differs from most legislation as it does not try to write government 
policy into legislation. Instead it attempts to give the Treasurer the ability to examine all 
foreign investment proposals in line with a fluid policy which is not at any time formally
255See regulations 3(h) - (j) See also Foreign Investment Review Board: Report 1994 - 95 AGPS 
Canberra 1996 p24 - 31 
256See regulation 3(q)
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set by strict rules. This fluid policy must, therefore, be the basis of the national interest. 
Therefore each application is to be judged on its own merits and not always with reference 
to past applications of a similar nature.
As has been stated "national interest" is a very hard term to define. The power is 
given to the Treasurer both to define "national interest" and to use the definition as a 
yardstick in judging applications for foreign investment. In Leisure & Entertainment Ptv 
Ltd v Willis Spender J found that:
"The ambit of the power conferred on the Treasurer is very wide. It is 
predicated by, apart from the factual circumstances of the parties, his 
opinion as to whether a proposal is contrary to the national interest." 257
His Honour would not direct how the discretion should be exercised. Spender J offered no
analysis of what matters make up the national interest. Spender J referred to Stephen J in
Murphvores Incorporated Ptv Ltd v The Commonwealth who, after examining a matter
which involved a 'breadth of considerations', said that the only reason a Court should
intervene to review a decision made under a statutory discretion, is where there has been a
lack of bona fides.258 Bad faith is a notoriously difficult ground of review to prove without
clear evidence, evidence in relation to foreign investment applications which is going to be
very difficult to obtain. This implies that national interest is an impossible notion to
encapsulate and not a concept to be tackled by the Courts for affirmation. There has, as
yet, been no case where a person has challenged a divestiture order or challenged the
conditions imposed on an application to invest on the ground that the conditions are ultra
vires. When such an action is submitted to a Court, that will provide the impetus for a
detailed examination of the Treasurer's discretion with regard to the national interest.
Relevant and Irrelevant Considerations
257No QG 204 of 1995, 31 
258(1975 - 76) 136 CLR 1, 14
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The discretion by the Treasurer to determine that an application is 'contrary to the 
national interest' is an unconfined discretion. The FAT Act provides no guidelines on 
which considerations are relevant or irrelevant in the exercise of the Treasurer's discretion. 
The failure to take into account relevant considerations and the taking into account 
irrelevant considerations are grounds of review open to a litigant challenging the 
Treasurer's decisions.259
Faced with a claim that the Treasurer has taken into account an irrelevant
consideration, the Court will examine the scope, subject-matter and purpose o f the FAT
Act to determine whether there are any limitations implied on the factors that the
Treasurer may legitimately take into account. When the Court examines an unconfined
discretion to see if all relevant considerations have been taken into account, the Court will
examine the Act to determine whether these considerations are implied by the Act.260 The
Courts may not to make a decision for the decision-maker. Only the decision-maker may
determine the weight given to a factor used by the Treasurer to make the decision. Mason
J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd261 said:
"in some circumstances a court may set aside an administrative decision 
which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great 
importance, or has given weight to a relevant factor of no great importance 
[on the ground] that the decision is 'manifestly unreasonable' "262
However, the Courts proceed cautiously to ensure that they do not review the decision on
its merits, but only examine the decision-making process. Mason J noted in relation to
decisions made by Ministers that:
"due allowance may have to be made for the taking into account o f broader 
policy considerations which may be relevant to the exercise of a ministerial 
discretion"263
259Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 60 ALJR 560
260For a detailed discussion see Relevant and Irrelevant Considerations Peter Bayne (1988) 62 ALJR 71 
261 (1986) 60 ALJR 560, 566 
262(1986) 60 ALJR 560, 566 
263( 1986) 60 ALJR 560, 566
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The discretion which is given to the Treasurer is very broad, the discretion is his to 
exercise. When considering an application, there are no stated factors which the Treasurer 
must take into account. Therefore, the relevance or irrelevance o f factors differs in every 
case. There can be little doubt after Leisure & Entertainment Ptv Ltd v Willis, that a 
competitor who challenges a decision of the Treasurer on the grounds of relevant and 
irrelevant considerations will be unsuccessful. However, where an investor challenges the 
conditions imposed on his application, a review of the reasons given by the Treasurer for 
the decision may reveal that the Treasurer had misconceived which factors should be taken 
into account and which should not. The review of a divestiture order will see the effective 
use of these two grounds of review. The divestiture order in relation to the purchase of 
shares and the purchase of residential real estate can only be made if the investor has failed 
to comply with conditions imposed on the investment. Therefore, the Courts will have to 
examine and determine whether the conditions were intra vires the FAT Act and whether 
the investor had complied with these conditions. The factors considered by the Treasurer 
as relevant or irrelevant when making the order to divest become an issue.
Natural Justice
The law of natural justice or "procedural fairness", according to current
nomenclature, has undergone considerable change in recent times. In Annetts v McCann264
the High Court restated the rule for the implication of natural justice as follows:
"It can now be taken as settled that, when a statute confers power upon a 
public official to destroy, defeat or prejudice a person's rights, interests or 
legitimate expectations, the rules of natural justice regulate the exercise of 
that power unless they are excluded by plain words of necessary 
intendment." 265
264(1990) 170 CLR 596
265(1990) 170 CLR 596, 598. In Salemi v Mackellar (No 2) Barwick J held that the obligation to accord 
natural justice "springs from the construction by the courts of the statute, in particular of the terms in 
which the power is granted, the nature of the power of the decision or action, the identity of the donee of 
the power and of its subject-matter".(1977) 137 CLR 396, 401 Mason J in Kioa v West (1985) 62 ALR 
321 put the test as: "When an order is made which will deprive a person of some right or interest or
ir \
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This statement received clear support in the joint judgement of Mason CJ, Dawson, 
Toohey and Gaudron JJ's in Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (Ainsworth's 
Case) . 266 Brennan J in a separate judgment in Ainsworth's Case also agreed with the 
'thrust o f the proposition ' . 267 His Honour noted that he had not been convinced of the use 
of the expression 'legitimate expectations' since Kioa v West268 This lack o f conviction has 
continued. His Honour says that:
"If a power is apt to affect the interests of an individual in a way that is 
substantially different from the way in which it is apt to affect the interests 
of the public at large, the repository of power will ordinarily be bound or 
entitled to have regard to the interests o f the individual before he exercises 
the power.
"The majority in Annetts v McCann went on to observe:
"In Kioa v West. Mason J said that the law in relation to administrative 
decisions 'has now developed to the point where it may be accepted that 
there is a common law duty to act fairly, in the sense o f according 
procedural fairness, in the making of administrative decisions which affect 
the rights, interests and legitimate expectations, subject only to the clear 
manifestation of a contrary statutory intention.' In Haoucher. Deane J. said 
that the law seemed to him 'to be moving toward a conceptually more 
satisfying position where common law requirements of procedural fairness 
will, in the absence of a clear contrary legislative intent, be recognised as 
applying to governmental executive decision-making' . " 269
On the possible displacement of the implication of procedural fairness, Brennan J in
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission observed:
"the observance of the rules of natural justice conditions the exercise of a 
statutory power thus: 'the presumption applies to any statutory power the 
exercise o f which is apt to affect the interests of an individual alone or is 
apt to affect his interests in a manner which is substantially different from 
the manner in which its exercise is apt to affect the interests of the public. 
O f course, the presumption may be displaced by the text of the statute, the 
nature of the power and the administrative framework created by the 
statute within which the power is exercised.' "270
legitimate expectation of a benefit, he is entitled to the case sought to be made against him and given an 
opportunity of replying to it."
266( 1992) 66 ALJR 271, 276 
267(1992) 66 ALR 271,282 
268( 1985) 62 ALR 321, 373 
269(1990) 170 CLR 596, 598.
270( 1992) 66 ALJR 271, 282 quoting from his judgement in Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 500, 619
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Opinion of the High Court in Annetts v McCann and in Ainsworth v Criminal Justice 
Commission indicates that the rules of natural justice are to be applied to a decision under 
the FAT Act which destroys, defeats or prejudices a persons' rights interests or legitimate 
expectations, unless there is a clear statutory intention for the rules not to apply. This 
intention must be clear. Section 18(2) of the FAT Act requires that, once a transaction is 
found to be subject to the section, the Treasurer must decide whether the transaction is 
contrary to the national interest. This section is subject to the compulsory reporting 
requirements of s26. This section differs from the divestiture sections as the applicant has 
not made or taken any steps toward investing. The application is a notification of an 
intention to invest. This situation resembles the application cases referred to by Megarry 
V-C in Mclnnes v Onslow-Fane.271 The applicant is only applying for permission to invest. 
The applicant can only expect that the application will be considered in the context of the 
stated policy. Should the stated policy change while the application is being processed or 
information is forwarded to the Treasurer which would defeat the proposal of the 
applicant, then the applicant would be entitled to a hearing concerning the changes of 
policy or the adverse findings, but not the application as a whole.
The position of the stranger wishing to be heard in relation to an application 
creates a further difficulty. The question arises: Does the obligation placed by the statute 
on the Treasurer make his decision one that is directed to the rights and expectations of 
the individual or is the decision of the Treasurer one which affects the community at large 
or a section of it? In Comptroller-General of Customs v Kawasaki Motors Ptv Ltd (No 
l ) 272 Hill and Heerey JJ held that there is a clear distinction between cases which refer to 
'procedures affecting personal or property rights or expectations', that is between decisions 
which pertain to the individual in contrast to decisions which pertain to the community at
*70
271 [1978] 1 WLR 1520 
272( 1991) 32 FCR 219
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large.273 Decisions under the FAT Act are directed at the individual. Each application is 
decided on its merits. However the rules of natural justice may not apply to all decisions 
under the FAT Act, but only to those decisions which affect the rights, interests or 
legitimate expectations of the complainant. As it is unlikely that natural justice will be 
implied into s i8(2) an applicant will have no success in pleading this ground, except in 
circumstance mentioned above. A stranger is unlikely to fare any better. In the situation 
where misleading statements are made about an Australian company and its ability to 
complete a transaction and the Treasurer relies on such statements in coming to his 
decision, the Australian company seeking the hearing to correct the misleading statements 
may be granted a hearing. The hearing would be to correct the misleading statements. 
However, the secrecy which surrounds an application made to the FIRB will make it 
unlikely that the Australian company will be able to obtain any of the information which 
the Treasurer considered in making his decision. Therefore any application for a hearing is 
unlikely to be timely.
The rules of natural justice will apply where divestiture is ordered274, despite the 
fact that the Treasurer's discretion is unconfined. By use of the divestiture provisions the 
Treasurer can alter transactions and agreements already entered into or completed. The 
discretion to order divestiture is unconfined. Although this suggests that Parliament 
intended that natural justice would not apply to any order for divestiture, it is only a 
suggestion and does not amount to "plain words o f necessary intendment".275 There can 
be little doubt that the legislature intended the Treasurer to be in a position to remove 
assets or rearrange company documents without first giving the parties to the transaction 
an opportunity to speak. This is even more certain when these orders can be enforced by 
criminal sanctions. The form of the hearing depends on the facts in each case.
273(1991) 32 FCR 219, 238 
274FAT Act s i8(4)
275Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion
The FAT Act is a fascinating study for the public lawyer. Decisions of the 
Treasurer under Part II of the FAT Act are difficult for the stranger to challenge.
Therefore competitors, employee groups and community groups will have no success in 
getting the Courts to review the decisions of the Treasurer. However there is some hope 
of success for the litigant who attempts to challenge the conditions which are imposed on 
an application or a decision of the Treasurer to order divestiture o f assets. The ARC has 
recommended that the FAT Act should be subject to the provisions of the AD(JR) Act. 
The Department of Treasury objected noting that the decisions of the Treasurer are 
inappropriate for review and that in would lead to an increase in litigation of the decisions 
of the Treasurer. It would appear that there would be no increase in litigation in relation to 
the FAT Act nor would the chances of reviewing the Treasurer's decision be increased. 
However, conditions attached to applications to invest and divestiture orders would be 
more easily reviewed.
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